BOOK, i.] APHOiusm 439 



it is the same as if in writing or printing one or tvro letters were 

 wrongly turned or misplaced, which is no great inconvenience to 

 the reader, who can easily by his own eye correct the error ; let 

 men in the same way conclude, that many experiments in natural 

 history may be erroneously believed and admitted, which are 

 easily expunged and rejected afterwards, by the discovery of 

 causes and axioms. It is, however, true, that if these errors in 

 natural history and experiments become great, frequent, and con 

 tinued, they cannot be corrected and amended by any dexterity 

 of wit or art. If then, even in our natural history, well ex 

 amined and compiled with such diligence, strictness, and (I might 

 say) reverential scruples, there be now and then something 

 icilse and erroneous in the details, what must we say of the com 

 mon natural history, which is so negligent and careless when 

 compared with ours ? or of systems of philosophy and the 

 sciences, based on such loose soil (or rather quicksand) F Let 

 none then be alarmed by such observations. 



CXIX. Again, our history and experiments will contain much 

 that is light and common, mean and illiberal, too refined and 

 merely speculative, and, as it were, of no use, and this per 

 haps may divert and alienate the attention of mankind. 



With regard to what is common ; let men reflect, that they 

 have hitherto been used to do nothing but refer and adapt the 

 causes of things of rare occurrence to those of things which 

 more frequently happen, without any investigation of the causes 

 of the latter, taking them for granted and admitted. 



Hence, they do not inquire into the causes of gravity, the 

 rotation of the heavenly bodies, heat, cold, light, hardness, soft 

 ness, rarity, density, liquidity, solidity, animation, inanimation, 

 similitude, difference, organic formation, but taking them to be 

 self-evident, manifest, and admitted, they dispute and decide 

 upon other matters of less frequent and familiar occurrence. 



But we (who know that no judgment can be formed of that 

 which is rare or remarkable, and much less anything new brought 

 to light, without a previous regular examination and discovery 

 of the causes of that which is common, and the causes again of 

 those causes) are necessarily compelled to admit the most common 

 objects into our history. Besides, we have observed that nothing 

 lias been so injurious to philosophy as this circumstance, namely, 

 that familiar and frequent objects do not arrest and detain men s 

 contemplation, but are carelessly admitted, and their causes 

 never inquired after ; so that information on unknown subjects 

 is not more often wanted than attention to those which are 

 known. 



CXX. With regard to the meanness, or even the filthiness of 

 particulars, for which (as Pliny observes*, an apology is requisite, 



