530 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. 



primitive Europe, they also make us aware of a significant 

 difference. For with the rise of class-distinctions in primitive 

 Europe, the rates of compensation, equal among members of 

 each class, had ceased to be equal between members of dif 

 ferent classes. Along with the growth of personally- derived 

 law, there had been a departure from the impersonally- 

 derived law as it originally existed. 



But now the truth to be noted is that, with the relative 

 weakening of kingly or aristocratic authority and relative 

 strengthening of popular authority, there revives the partially- 

 suppressed kind of law derived from the consensus of indi 

 vidual interests ; and the kind of law thus originating tends 

 continually to replace all other law. Eor the chief business 

 of courts of justice at present, is to enforce, without respect of 

 persons, the principle, recognized before governments arose, 

 that all members of the community, however otherwise dis 

 tinguished, shall be similarly dealt with when they aggress 

 one upon another. Though the equalization of injuries by 

 retaliation is no longer permitted ; and though the Govern 

 ment, reserving to itself the punishment of transgressors, does 

 little to enforce restitution or compensation ; yet, in pur 

 suance of the doctrine that all men are equal before the law, 

 it has the same punishment for transgressors of every class. 

 And then in respect of unfulfilled contracts or disputed debts, 

 from the important ones tried at Assizes to the trivial ones 

 settled in County Courts, its aim is to maintain the rights and 

 obligations of citizens without regard for wealth or rank. Of 

 course in our transition state the change is incomplete. But 

 the sympathy with individual claims, and the consensus of 

 individual interests accompanying it, lead to an increasing 

 predominance of that kind of law which provides directly 

 for social order; as distinguished from, that kind of law 

 which indirectly provides for social order by insisting on 

 obedience to authority, divine or human. With decline of 

 the rfyime of status and growth of the regime of contract, 

 personally-derived law more and more gives place to imper- 



