430 INDUSTRIAL INSTITUTIONS. 



In many societies this industrial usage, naturally evolved, 

 has been made imperative by law; and legislative wisdom 

 has been credited with it and its supposed advantages. An 

 cient China yields an instance. Said a prisoner to the Mar 

 quis of Tsin &quot; Music was the profession of my father; 

 dared I learn any other? &quot; And in the Tksi-yuit is writ 

 ten 



&quot; The sons of officers ought always to be officers ; the sons of artisans 

 ought always to be artisans ; the sons of merchants ought always to be 

 merchants, and the sons of farmers ought always to be farmers.&quot; 

 The like happened in ancient Egypt. According to 

 Duncker 



&quot;We learn that no one was allowed to follow any other occupation 

 than that derived from his father. The inscriptions tell us that the 

 same office, as for instance that of architect, remained in the same 

 family for twenty -three generations.&quot; 

 Similarly in Greece, custom led to injunction. 



At Athens &quot;it was conceived, moreover, that, if men confined them 

 selves to one calling, they would arrive therein at greater excellence ; 

 and the law, accordingly, forbade them to be of two trades.&quot; 

 And it was so in ancient Mexico, where, says Clavigero 



&quot;The sons in general learned the trades of their fathers, and 

 embraced their professions. Thus they perpetuated the arts in 

 families to the advantage of the state.&quot; 



Hereafter, in dealing with the organization and govern 

 ment of gilds, we shall find everywhere illustrated similar 

 tendencies and results. In this place it concerns us only to 

 observe that the power of the father as industrial regulator, 

 is necessarily implied. 



