DISCUSSION 141 



could not be brought into connection with the 

 sense-organs or their perceptions. * / have no reason 

 for suspecting the existence of such concepts or ideals 

 in any other living creature, not even in the highest 

 animals. But, he went on to say, he had no more 

 reason for suspecting the existence of concepts or 

 ideals in a new-born child, or in one still unborn, 

 and only in process of formation. 



The recognition made by Dr. Friedenthal 

 of my psychological opinion (as opposed to 

 Bolsche, von Hansemann, Juliusburger, and 

 other speakers) was a pleasant surprise. That 

 in man the higher intellectual faculties can 

 enter into a state of activity only after the 

 lower faculties with their nerve centres have 

 been developed, is explained in my remarks 

 upon Dr. Juliusburger s speech. 



We shall be asked, said Friedenthal, how we 

 know anything of the soul of an animal ; whence we 

 learn what animals feel and what ideas they have. 

 Our knowledge is based upon conclusions derived 

 from analogies. We cannot actually know what 

 an animal thinks, but its movements and general 

 behaviour force us, bearing in mind its previous 

 history, to conclude that an animal has no concepts 

 and ideals. And Psychology teaches us why man 

 is so radically unlike beasts because man alone 

 possesses speech, from which concepts and ideals 

 can be formed. 



