DISCUSSION 161 



Answer to No. 1. It would undoubtedly be 

 a mistake to regard the soul as belonging only 

 to the intellect, but a mistake is made no less 

 by assigning it to the will or the feelings ; for 

 the essence of the soul does not consist of its 

 activity, whether intellectual, or voluntary, or 

 sensitive, but the soul is the efficient cause and 

 the permanent subject of all these phenomena. 

 Nevertheless we are right in deducing, from the 

 unique character of these psychical processes, 

 the unique character of their efficient cause, 

 and therefore the unique character of the soul. 



If it were possible to set the desires and 

 impulses of beasts and plants on a level with 

 acts of human volition, we might be able to 

 maintain that there was an essential likeness 

 between man, beast, and plant. But as long 

 as this has not been done (and Dr. Juliusburger 

 does not prove its possibility), even from the 

 point of view of voluntarism, this conclusion 

 is not admissible. We must indeed assume, 

 that there is an interior principle of perception 

 and desire, but we must assume its existence 

 only to the extent in which it manifests itself 

 exteriorly. In plants we find no evidence at all 

 of perception and desire, and in beasts only 

 such as shows them to be essentially different 

 from human acts of volition and thought, 

 though not from the lower acts of sense. 



Thus it is to man alone that we may ascribe 

 L 



