206 THE PROBLEM OF EVOLUTION 



imagined be but matter ? Thus we might see, that 

 from the assumption of the eternity of God followed 

 immediately the eternity of matter. A person who 

 imagines nothing (and apart from matter nothing 

 can be imagined) is nothing at all. Matter can only 

 be defined as an aggregate of definite conformities 

 to law. If, then, we allow that matter with its con 

 formity to law has existed from all eternity, we can 

 very well dispense with its starting-point, i.e. with 

 God. 



This argument contains the following four 

 logical blunders, to which I need only draw 

 attention shortly. 



(1) In order to think of God, we must be 

 able to imagine Him by aid of our senses. 

 Professor Dahl rightly laid stress upon the 

 inaccuracy of this idea. 



(2) The idea of imagination presupposes 

 the existence of the thing imagined. If this 

 were true, no artist could ever produce a new 

 work of art. 



(3) God s knowledge is subject to as many 

 limitations as man s, who cannot think of any 

 thing which he cannot imagine by aid of his 

 senses. 



(4) The conformity to law on the part of 

 matter is something that we can imagine by 

 aid of the senses. In reality it is something of 

 which we can only think, underlying the pheno- 



