4 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. 



To bring out the contrast between the two orders of mental product, the 

 sensible and the intellectual, let us revert to our illustration of the table-bell. 

 It will enable us to realize that while the object grasped by sense cognition is 

 concrete, individual, and limited by conditions of time, place, and material 

 existence, the object grasped by intellect, through the idea, is abstract, uni 

 versal, and independent of all such changing conditions and limitations. The 

 thing perceived by the senses or reproduced by the imagination is always a 

 definite individual thing apprehended as composed of this matter, endowed 

 with these properties, existing here at this particular moment. This thing 

 (the table-bell), which I see with my eyes and touch with my hands, is made 

 of this particular piece of bronze, round in shape, agreeable in tone, resting 

 here and now on this particular corner of this particular desk. All this is 

 perfectly determined. But I can also think of a table-bell not of bronze, nor 

 round in shape, nor agreeable to hear, nor resting here and now upon my 

 desk, of a table-bell which abstracts from all those particularities. No doubt, 

 the table-bell thus thought of, apart from all those particular conditions, will, 

 if it exist at all, be made of some metal or other ; it will be of some shape or 

 other ; it will emit some sound or other ; it will be localized some place or 

 other, and exist at some time or other. But, as this table-bell of abstract 

 thought may be made of any metal at all, be of any shape, yield any sound, 

 exist anywhere and any time, it will evidently serve to represent to my mind, 

 inadequately, of course, but faithfully as far as it goes, any and every possible 

 and actual table-bell of whatsoever material, shape, sound and whereabouts. 



Any object or thing thus considered, apart from all the particularizing 

 conditions with which it is really endowed when existing in the actual order 

 of things, is called an abstract object ; for to abstract mentally any object is 

 precisely to consider apart &quot; separatim considerare &quot; that which the thing 

 or object is, while laying aside the particular characteristics which give it this, 

 that, or the other definite and determined individuality. Once an object is 

 thus conceived in the abstract by the intellect, it is seen to be capable of being 

 embodied or realized equally and indifferently in an indefinite multitude of 

 individual instances : which is the same as saying that it becomes or is made 

 universal by the consideration of the intellect. 



These two functions of abstracting and generalizing its objects are the 

 characteristic features of the cognitive activity of human reason or intelligence. 



It is of the greatest importance to distinguish clearly between the concrete, 

 individual thing, which is the object of mere sense perception or imagination, 

 and the abstract, universal object, which is apprehended by thought proper. 

 We can think, or have ideas, of objects which are not perceptible to our 

 senses : for instance, objects not actually existent but only conceivable, such 

 as a flying horse ; or objects which we believe or know to exist, but to be un- 

 perceivable because not material, such as God, a pure spirit, the human soul, 

 truth, virtue, similarity. And the things we do perceive by our senses we 

 conceive by our intellects in a manner entirely different from that in which 

 we perceive them. We perceive each numerical individual object of a class, 

 as it exists in the concrete, John, James, Thomas, etc. We conceive the 

 nature that is embodied or realized in each, and in virtue of which we put 

 them into a common class, man; and we conceive this common human 

 nature or humanity in the abstract, i.e. neglecting or not considering the 



