32 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. 



themselves objecta primae intent ionis mentis : these constitute the object of 

 metaphysics. But when the mind proceeds to reflect on those first abstract 

 objects of its direct thought, to compare them with one another and thus to 

 establish mental relations between them, these reflex acts are called secundae 

 intentiones mentis second or reflex views of the objects, not now as simply 

 existing in themselves, but as directly known or thought of by the mind and 

 these mental or logical relations thus established between the objecta primae 

 intentionis are themselves called objecta secundae intentionis. With these 

 latter logic is concerned. 1 



When the reality is brought by a direct abstract thought a prima in- 

 tentio\nto the domain of intelligence, and there acquires that peculiar mode 

 of presence given by knowledge a presence which the ancients called inten- 

 tionalis, it can become the object of reflex thought, can be endowed with 

 numerous purely mental or rational attributes objecta secundae intentionis, 

 and thus falls within the scope of logic. 



The relations thus established by the mind between its own objective 

 concepts by reflection upon the latter, do not and cannot exist or occur in any 

 sphere of reality, actual or possible, about which the mind can think, other 

 than the sphere of its own thought about such actual or possible reality. They 

 are products of the mind s thinking processes, nothing more. They are psy 

 chologically real, as subjective or mental products ; but the only objective 

 reality they have is that which the mind itself gives them by thinking them : 

 as it does in logic, where it distinguishes clearly between them as its own 

 creations, devoid of all other actual or possible reality and the realities which 

 it does not create but only apprehends by its direct thought, as actual or pos 

 sible. 



How logic actually deals with these entia rationis, these compartments, 

 comparisons, and relations, which it establishes in the contemplation of things, 

 we have already discussed, in dealing with the consistency and truth of 

 thought. It examines the various forms of thought in detail : concept, judg 

 ment, class, genus, species, subject, predicate, inference, syllogism, antecedent, 

 consequent, etc. It examines them, however, not in their empty, abstract form, 

 but in their applications to reality ; it applies to man, for example, the concept 

 of species, and to animal that of genus, and compares these two real objects of 

 thought man and animal : objecta primae intentionis in the light of the logi 

 cal relations tf. genus zxA species which it establishes between them. Here, 

 obviously, we reach the point of contact between logic and metaphysics. Each 

 science alike contributes to our knowledge of all being : metaphysics by seizing 

 on those deepest and widest of its attributes which must pervade and elucidate 

 the assumptions of all the other sciences, logic by analysing the processes 



l4 Sciendum est,&quot; says St. Thomas, &quot;quod alia ratione est de communibus 

 Logica et Philosophia Prima. Philosophia enim Prima est de communibus, quia 

 ejus consideratio est circa ipsas res communes, scilicet circa ens et partes et pas- 

 siones entis. Et quia circa omnia quae in rebus sunt, habet negotiari ratio, Logica 

 autem est de operationibus rationis, Logica etiam erit de his, quae communia sunt 

 omnibus, id est de intentionibus rationis, quae ad omnes res se habent. Non autem 

 ita quod Logica sit de ipsis rebus communibus, sicut de subjectis. Considerat enim 

 Logica, sicut subjecta, syllogismuni, enunciationem, praedicatum aut aliquid hujus- 

 modi.&quot; In Post. Anal., i., sect. 2. 



