DIVISIONS OF CONCEPTS AND TERMS. 49 



mind by it, we shall &amp;gt; find room for three distinct ways of under 

 standing this connexion. 



First, there is the sum-total of attributes brought up before the 

 mind of any individual by the presence in his mind of the concept 

 expressed by the term in question : the whole content of his mental 

 state, whatever way this content may be directly or indirectly 

 implied, or suggested by psychological association of ideas with 

 the mention of the term. This quantity is essentially variable 

 from individual to individual. To no two individuals does the 

 mention of a term or the presence of an object of any class, bring 

 up exactly the same subjective, mental state. This variable group 

 of attributes forms the Subjective Intension or Content of the notion 

 or term. It is of little logical importance, because logic deals 

 not with what is subjective and variable in thought, but with what 

 is objective and fixed. In its most scientific form, the content or 

 subjective intension of a concept would be the group of attributes 

 generally known at any given time, by people acquainted with the 

 class, to be actually common to all its members. 



Secondly, there is the sum-total of all the attributes de facto 

 common to the objects referred to, whether these attributes be 

 known or not. The mental concept that would embrace or com 

 prehend all these may be regarded as the ideal at which our 

 knowledge of things ought to aim. Here the standpoint is objec 

 tive ; and this Objective Intension of the concept or term we will 

 call its Comprehension. Beyond the content of each individual s 

 notion of the objects in question assuming that content in each 

 case to be correct as far as it goes the comprehension would 

 usually include other yet unknown attributes : unless we could 

 venture as we cannot to say of any one class of object, that 

 our knowledge of it is absolutely perfect and complete. 



Finally, between the subjective and objective groups of attri 

 butes we can conceive an intermediate group containing those 

 qualities and those only which are regarded as essential to the ob 

 jects^ in the sense that the name would not be given to any object 

 found wanting in any one of those qualities. Such attributes are 

 regarded as constituting the definition of the objects in ques 

 tion. No individual would be regarded as a member of that class 

 of objects without all of those attributes. The fixing of this group 

 is undoubtedly guided by reference to the objects themselves, to 

 their generally known attributes ; but it is to a certain extent con- 

 ventional, though not of course arbitrary. And the fixing of 

 VOL. I. 4 



