DIVISIONS OF CONCEPTS AND TERMS. 57 



individuals which constitute it. The former relation is between universal con 

 cepts only : it brings out the contrast between the unity and the variety in a 

 general notion. The latter relation is between a general notion and the in 

 dividual instances of which it is verified. Mr. Joseph rightly draws attention 

 to the distinction between the two kinds of relation. But when he says of the 

 latter relation that &quot;what is meant by the common term predicated of them 

 all [the individuals] remains the same,&quot; l he means to imply that this is not so 

 when we predicate a generic notion about a specific notion. But it is 

 so : when I say &quot;.the horse is an animal &quot; and &quot;man is an animal,&quot; the pre 

 dicate &quot;animal&quot; has the same implication in both propositions, no less than 

 it has when I say &quot; Bucephalus is an animal &quot; and &quot; Socrates is an animal &quot;. 

 Describing the relation of a class to its individuals as denotation and that 

 of a class to its sub-classes as extension, Mr. Joseph contends further that the 

 doctrine of any sort of inverse relation between extension and intension is 

 unsound : 2 that the wider term is not the poorer in meaning but rather the 

 richer, inasmuch as it brings before the mind the rich choice of possible alter 

 natives involved in the known variety of sub-classes latent in the unity of the 

 higher class itself. But this wealth of indefinite meaning constitutes what we 

 have called the subjective intension or content suggested to the individual by 

 the use of the term in a given judgment or context, not the definite meaning 

 which we have called connotation. Extension is not connected inversely with 

 the former (31), but it is with the latter. 



35. ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE TERMS. The next question 

 that suggests itself is whether all our concepts and terms have in 

 tension or connotation and whether all have extension or denota 

 tion. We shall find it convenient, however, to refer first to an 

 other division of terms: the division into Abstract and Concrete. 

 We have been speaking hitherto about &quot; things &quot; (or &quot; objects &quot;) 

 and &quot; attributes &quot; in connexion with intension and extension. 

 We must now see what is the meaning of each of these words ; 

 for a concrete term is usually defined as the name of a thing ; an 

 abstract term as the name of an attribute considered alone or apart 

 from any thing. 



It will be seen presently that this division is primarily applic 

 able to terms or names rather than to concepts, that it is more 

 grammatical than logical, and that it is of importance in logic only 

 indirectly by the light it throws on the intension and extension of 

 concepts and on the nature of the mental act of judgment. Here 

 we have first to observe that an abstract term generosity^ hu 

 manity &amp;gt; for example is not so called because the idea it expresses 

 was arrived at by a process of mental abstraction. For we have 

 seen already (4, 5) that all universal ideas, and therefore all gen 

 eral terms concrete no less than abstract are the outcome of 



1 op. cit. t p. 139. *op. cit., pp. 123 sqq. 



