62 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. 



them), though we have not given their indefinite applicability the name o 

 extension or denotation (33).* 



37. ARE ABSTRACT TERMS AND PROPER NAMES CON- 

 NOTATIVE? NON-CONNOTATIVE TERMS. Dealing next with the 

 reference of our concepts and terms to attributes we may ask : 

 Have all concepts and terms intension or connotation ? There 

 are two classes of terms about which there may be room for 

 doubt : (a) abstract terms, and (&) proper names. 



(a) Seeing that the direct and in fact the only reference of 

 abstract concepts and terms is to attributes, we should have no 

 hesitation in saying that they have content, connotation, compre 

 hension that they have, in fact, no other sort of meaning but 

 implicational meaning. 



We would say, therefore, that these have implication or intension, but 

 not application or extension. Furthermore, if we use the word denotation 

 for reference (of our concepts and terms) to things, and connotation for 

 reference to attributes, we must say that abstract terms have connotation and 

 have not denotation. Although, however, the expression is appropriate as 

 regards denial of denotation for abstract ter ms do not denote, or note down, 

 point out, or stand for, things it is awkward as regards connotation for, 

 etymologically, to connote means to note something together with or in addi 

 tion to something else denoted; and there is no &quot; something else denoted &quot; 

 in the case of the abstract term. We doubt, however, if it improves matters 

 to say that abstract terms are non-connotative because they denote the attri 

 butes connoted by the concrete terms, and have themselves nothing left to 

 connote. 3 This usage endows the same word, denotation, with a twofold 

 reference to attributes and to things. 



Other logicians, distinguishing, as above (36), between general and 

 singular abstract terms, hold that the latter are non-connotative, the former 

 connotative. Such abstract terms as shape, colour, virtue, etc., being 

 general, would be likewise necessarily connotative each denoting the dif 

 ferent discernible kinds of shape, colour, virtue, respectively, and connoting 

 the common attribute (or group) by the possession of which these kinds 

 belong to the same genus or class. The distinctions which arise in our 

 thoughts about things are thus carried by analogy into our thoughts about 

 attributes. 



() We have assumed in what we have just been saying that 

 a Connotative Term is one which implies attributes whether it de 

 notes a subject or not, 3 and that a Denotative Term is one which 

 denotes or points out a thing or things whether it connotes attri 

 butes or not. We have seen that in this sense abstract terms are 



l Cf. VENN, op. cit. t p. 178. 2 jEVONS, Principles of Science, chap, ii., 3. 



The words &quot;in addition to denoting a subject&quot; would convey the more com 

 monly accepted definition. 



