DIVISIONS OF CONCEPTS AND TERMS. 69 



thing cannot be in the same respect simultaneously white and 

 black (contraries cannot be true together), it may be neither white 

 nor black (but blue, i.e. contraries maybe false together), though 

 it must either be white or not be white (contradictories cannot be 

 either true together or false together: cf. 112, 113). 



41. SIMPLE REPUGNANCE: PRIVATIVE OPPOSITION. Con 

 cepts and terms are described as simply repugnant, when, without 

 being collectively exhaustive like contradictories, or in extreme opposi 

 tion like contraries, they nevertheless imply attributes which are mutu 

 ally exclusive, and cannot, therefore, be simultaneously affirmed of 

 the same object Thus &quot; red,&quot; &quot; blue,&quot; &quot; green,&quot; are incompatible 

 in this sense ; so also &quot; made of wood,&quot; &quot; of delf,&quot; &quot; of iron,&quot; 

 etc. Such objects of thought are also called disparate. 



This division, likewise, is purely material and of little logical 

 importance. It is sometimes not easy to draw the line between 

 simple repugnance and contrariety. What are called privative 

 terms will illustrate this. We may define these as terms which 

 connote the absence of an attribute in a subject capable of possessing 

 it, whether this subject might be specially expected to have that 

 attribute or not. For example, &quot; lame,&quot; &quot; blind,&quot; &quot; deaf,&quot; &quot; dumb,&quot; 

 etc., imply \htprivation of an attribute naturally expected in the 

 subjects of which they are usually predicated. Unhappy, sense 

 less, unfortunate, disagreeable and all that class of terms referred 

 to above as apparent contradictories are also privative inasmuch 

 as they imply the absence of some attribute which the subject is 

 capable of possessing. But these have all come to possess a posi 

 tive element of connotation, which destroys their formally negative 

 character and makes them positively incompatible with and 

 sometimes even directly contrary to the original positive term. 

 Thus &quot; unhappy&quot; connotes the absence of some element essential 

 to happiness, the presence of some elements making the subject 

 capable of happiness, and the presence of some positive element or 

 elements incompatible with the absent one, and producing the 

 positive state of unhappiness. If these latter be multiplied or 

 intensified to the extreme limit conceivable, they make a person 

 not merely unhappy, but even the contrary of happy, that is to 

 say, miserable. 



The whole doctrine of logical opposition has reference only to connota- 

 tive or significant concepts and terms ; it can be applied in no intelligible 

 sense to proper names. 



