THE PREDICABLES. 87 



inseparable accidents. The former may be entirely separated or 

 removed from the class or the individual, the connexion being 

 altogether contingent and reversible, as in the instances just 

 given ; they may be absent without changing the conceptual 

 sameness or identity of the class or of the individual ; they are de 

 facto found to be absent from some members in the case of a 

 class accident as &quot;white&quot; in regard to &quot;swans&quot; or to be 

 sometimes present, sometimes absent, in the case of an indi 

 vidual accident. The inseparable accident, however, is some 

 quality which is found to belong invariably as a matter of fact to 

 all the members of a class (or to be always present in an indivi 

 dual ; a certain group of such attributes (47) constituting what 

 may be called the differentia individua of the individual). Thus 

 &quot; cloven-hoofed &quot; is an inseparable accident of &quot;ruminants,&quot; 

 &quot; blackness&quot; of the &quot;raven&quot; or of an &quot;Ethiopian&quot;. 



When, then, it may be asked, is a certain quality or attribute which is 

 always and invariably found in all members of a class and perhaps of that 

 class alone to be regarded as a property, and when as an inseparable 

 accident ? The answer is that we are to regard it merely as an inseparable 

 accident as long as we are unable to discover any necessary connexion be 

 tween it and the specific nature of the class in question as long as we can 

 even conceive it to be absent &quot;absque hoc quod subject! ratio destruatur&quot; in 

 the words of Cajetan, or, in modern language, &quot; without interfering with the 

 connotation or other known properties of the class&quot;. Mere observation, 

 therefore, may reveal to us the actual, invariable presence of an attribute in 

 a class of subjects ; but we cannot call it a property in the strict sense until 

 we have so analysed the nature and known properties of the subject in ques 

 tion as to be able to pronounce that the attribute must be present, as being 

 necessarily involved in, or connected with, those more fundamental thought- 

 objects 1 which we have already regarded as constituting the specific nature of 

 the subject and as yielding the connotation of its specific class name, or with 

 some property or properties already known to follow necessarily from this speci 

 fic nature. As soon, therefore, as the attribute becomes inseparable not merely 

 in fact but in thought from what we have already conceived as constituting 

 the nature and properties of the subject, that attribute becomes for us a 

 Property of that subject. 



In the purely abstract sciences, such as geometry, there is really no room 

 for &quot;accidents&quot;: &quot;in geometry there are no happenings, no conjunc 

 tures &quot; : 2 the attributes we discover and demonstrate from our definitions 

 and axioms are all properties. But in the concrete sciences it is different. 

 For example, the attribute we call &quot;mortality,&quot; and by which we understand 

 the subjection of a living organism to decay, corruption, and death, we see to 



1 We cannot properly call those fundamental realities attributes of the thing ; for 

 they constitute its very essence and enter into its definition. 



2 JOSEPH, op.,cit., p. 84. 



