DEFINITION. 93 



TIAM. In apparent opposition to the scholastic account of defini 

 tion as the &quot; oratio quae explicat quid sit res aliqua &quot; the explana 

 tion of what a thing is, we find the more modern description of 

 definition as the &quot;explicit statement of the connotation of a 

 term&quot;. 1 The opposition is apparent rather than real. For terms 

 are the outward expression of concepts, which, in turn, are mental 

 representations of things. Whence it follows that whatever 

 explains the connotation of a term, or of the corresponding con 

 cept, explains likewise the nature or essence of the thing the 

 reality represented by the concept. 



In order to emphasize this essential and inseparable con 

 nexion of term, thought, and thing, it would be well, perhaps, to 

 describe Definition as the Explanation of the nature of an object of 

 thought by explicitly unfolding the connotation of the term by which 

 we refer to that object. Both the mental process, and the verbal 

 formula which sums up its result, are called definition. Etymo- 

 logically, the term would signify a process of marking the bound 

 aries or limits of the implication of our concepts and, by way 

 of consequence, of their application also thus enabling us to dis 

 tinguish between the various objects of our thoughts. 



Definitio per genus et differentiam. If definition, then, is the 

 explicit unfolding or analysis of the connotation of a term, the 

 question arises, How far are we to go in our analysis of attri 

 butes, in setting forth a definition ? 



Firstly, we need not, and should not, go beyond the connota 

 tion, or proceed to enumerate the properties (47) of the object 

 in question. We must not imagine the ideally perfect definition 

 to be one which would give us the fullest possible knowledge we 

 can have of the nature and properties of the thing to be defined. 2 

 Such an exhaustive analysis goes beyond the scope of definition^ 

 involving metaphysical analysis, demonstration, or scientific ex 

 planation. No one would think of including in the definition 

 of a right-angled triangle all the properties which geometricians 

 have ever, by pure deductive reasoning; discovered in it. Such a 

 catalogue would constitute what has been more accurately 

 described as the &quot; metaphysical analysis &quot; 3 of the object. The 

 true aim of definition is rather to include &quot; the minimum number 



1 WELTON, Logic, i., p. 107. 



2 See DE WULF, Scholasticism Old and New, pp. 12-14, 142, for some interest 

 ing attempts at framing a definition of Scholasticism. 



3 WELTON, op. cit., p. 126. 



