98 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. 



to their connotation ? If in answer to the former of these questions 

 we refer back to cases (a) and (ft) above, we may observe that 

 the only way to disclose to one who does not already know it, the 

 reference of & proper name, is by pointing out to him, or otherwise 

 bringing into his experience, the actual individual object to which 

 the name refers ; l and that, in like manner, the only way of con 

 veying to others a notion of what we mean by a simple, unanalys 

 able abstract name, such as &quot; redness,&quot; for example, is by de 

 scribing it as &quot; the colour of a field of poppies, hips and haws, 

 ordinary sealing-wax, bricks made from certain kinds of clay, 

 etc. &quot;. 2 



In answer to the second question, a glance at the things 

 referred to in (c) will convince us that there are innumerable class 

 names with whose denotation we are much more familiar than 

 we are with their connotation. Were a child asked for a defini 

 tion of animal: &quot;What do you mean by an animal?&quot; it would 

 be far more likely to answer, &quot; I mean dogs, horses, cows, and all 

 that sort of thing,&quot; 3 or, pointing to a dog or some other animal, 

 &quot; I mean something like that&quot; ; 4 than to make any attempt at 

 analysing the connotation of the term, and defining animal as a 

 sentient living organism. 



Perhaps, therefore, instead of first fixing the connotation, and 

 allowing the ordinary (or intensive) definition to determine for us 

 indirectly the denotation, of the term, it might in many cases be 

 more convenient to have recourse to a process which would show 

 directly the denotation of the class name. To fix the latter directly 

 in this way would be to determine the membership of the class 

 row, within^ by taking some individual object as centre or type, 

 and grouping others around it according to their degrees of 

 resemblance, before the outside limits of the class (and with them 

 the connotation of the class name) have been definitely decided. 

 This process, which is called &quot; Classification by Type,&quot; is the one 

 which in all probability has often actually occurred &quot; in the case 



1 When, for instance, we ask &quot;What is Cam Tual ? &quot;, we wish to know what is 

 the thing or object for which it stands, of which it is the name; and the answer 

 &quot; Cam Tual is the highest mountain in Ireland &quot; would be the nearest approach to 

 definition. The process by which we impose a proper name on an individual 

 &quot; This child is to be called John &quot;is not a definition. Neither is the judgment by 

 which we identify an object by means of its proper name, or its class name &quot; That 

 blue point is Snowdon &quot; (VENN, op. cit., p. 211), &quot; That object in the distance is a 

 horse &quot; to be regarded as a definition. 



2 KBYNES, op. cit., p. 35. 3 C/. CLARKE, Logic, p. 216. 

 4 WBLTON, op. cit. t i., p. 122 ; VENN, op. cit. t p. 306. 



