ioo THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. 



nominal, conceptual, and real, inasmuch as term, thought, and thing, 

 are inseparable. At the same time, it must be admitted that 

 while in some definitions the sole concern seems to be with names, 

 in others it seems to be no less decisively with things ; and the dis 

 tinction between Nominal Definition and Real Definition has been 

 always recognized by logicians, though perhaps never quite 

 satisfactorily explained. 1 The formula for a nominal definition 



is pointed out to be &quot; The word means . . . &quot; as distinct 



from the formula for real definition u&amp;lt; is . . . &quot;; and 



the Scholastics distinguished clearly between Real Definition, 

 which explains the nature of a thing, and Nominal Definition, 

 which explains the meaning of a name or term. But this seems 

 to be, at least to some extent, a distinction without a difference ; 

 for, how can we explain the meaning whether the implicational, 

 or even merely the applicational, meaning of a term, without some 

 reference to the reality which is the object of the concept expressed 

 by the name, whether this reality be a thing or an attribute? 

 The most we can allow, therefore, in this direction, is that some 

 definitions aim primarily at securing the correct use especially 

 the correct applicational use pf names, and may thence, perhaps, 

 be called nominal; while others refer us more directly to the 

 nature of thing which they explain, and may thence, perhaps, be 

 called real. 



Those who seek to detect a deeper difference are not unanimous in the 

 explanations they offer us. 2 



Hamilton s view a that the nominal definition &quot;clears up the relation of 

 words to notions,&quot; while the real clears up the relation &quot; of notions to things &quot; 

 establishes a distinction which is more apparent than real, for no definition 

 of the notion can abstract from the relation of the latter to the thing which is 

 its object. 



Ueberweg 4 explains the distinction by pointing out that whereas the 

 nominal definition merely analyses the notion, without determining whether 

 the latter has for its object something real or something merely conjured 

 up by the individual mind, that is to say, without determining or guaranteeing 

 the objective validity of the notion ; the real definition, on the contrary, 

 always carries with it the proof or the implication that the object of the 

 definer s notion is not a mere mental fiction of his own, but has an objective 

 existence in some particular sphere (33) besides the existence it has in his 

 passing thought and the existence it has in other people s thoughts as 



1 Compare the analogous distinction between Formal Division and Material 

 Division, next chapter. 



2 C/. VENN op. cit., pp. 273 : 8 ; WELTON, op. cit., pp. 118-20; CLARKE, op. cit., 

 pp. 197-200. 



3 HAMILTON S Reid, p. 691. 4 Logic, pp. 164-7. 



