DEFINITION. I oi 



implied by the very fact that it has got a name. In other words, real defini 

 tion is of notions that are objectively valid. 



This does not seem to differ substantially from Mill s view ! : &quot;in some 

 definitions, it is clearly apparent, that nothing is intended except to explain the 

 meaning of the word ; while in others, besides explaining the meaning of the 

 word, it is intended to be implied that there exists a thing, corresponding to 

 the word &quot; ; exists, that is, in some particular sphere other than that of the 

 thoughts of those who offer or dispute the definition. This view is repre 

 sented by Prof. Welton 2 as &quot; practically, that set forth originally by Aristotle 

 that Nominal Definitions are those in which there is no evidence of the 

 existence of the objects to which the name is applied &quot;. And it is an 

 intelligible view ; it shows us why the same definition is accepted by some 

 and repudiated by others : because, namely, there is difference of opinion as 

 to the sphere in which the thing defined exists, as to whether it really exists 

 as such in the sphere in which it is believed to exist by those who propose 

 the definition, and in which its existence is supposed by all to be implied by 

 the definition : there could be no other intelligible reason for such con 

 troversies as scientists, philosophers, and theologians, are wont to carry 

 on about certain definitions. This view represents the function of nominal 

 definition as being merely to secure a common understanding about the attri 

 butes we include in, and the things we denote by, the terms and concepts 

 which we use, without implying in any way the actual existence or occurrence of 

 these things or attributes in any particular sphere. This explains the Scholastic 

 adage : Initium disputandi, definitio nominis : Discussion about anything 

 must be opened by nominal definition : which will secure identity of meaning 

 in our language and save us from verbal disputes ; the insinuation being that 

 it is only at the end of our discussion and investigation that we can frame a 

 real definition : which will explain the nature of the thing for us and guarantee 

 its real existence in its appropriate sphere. 



&quot; Before looking for a thing,&quot; says Satolli, 3 &quot; we must evidently know 

 what we are looking for &quot; : which may mean either that we must agree as to 

 what our term or notion connotes before we can proceed to find out whether 

 any object with such a group of attributes really exists in any sphere, and not 

 merely in our own thought ; or that we must agree as to what our term or 

 notion denotes before we can proceed to explore the nature of the object 

 denoted ; either preliminary convention being presumably nominal (definition, 

 intensive in the former case and extensive in the latter. The former carries 

 with it no implication of the existence of the thing defined. The latter, how 

 ever, starting with the denotation (as explained above, 53) seems to carry 

 with it such implication of existence ; though for another reason (there indi 

 cated) it is more emphatically nominal in its character than intensive definition 

 is : inasmuch, namely, as it merely identifies the object referred to by the name, 

 without giving any information at least any definite information 4 about the 

 nature of the object, while intensive definition does give us some such informa 

 tion. 



1 Logic, bk. i., ch. viii., 5. 2 op. cit., i., p. 120. 



3 apud MERCIER, Logique, p. 274. 



4 It presupposes some information, as intensive definition does, and it gives such 

 vague information as that upon which the common name is given to the objects 

 classified (53). 



