136 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. 



number of widest groups. It is a question of applying the 

 principles of a natural or general classification, not to this or that 

 particular department of human knowledge, but to the whole 

 sphere of knowable reality. 



The problem has evidently two quite distinct, though insepar 

 able, aspects ; for a classification of those direct universal ideas, 

 by means of which we represent and interpret things for ourselves, 

 is necessarily, eo ipso, a classification of the objects of those notions, 

 a classification of things, beings, realities. Were we to follow up 

 the problem from the latter standpoint, to see what light such a 

 classification might possibly throw upon the nature and attributes 

 of real being, our investigation would be metaphysical ; were we 

 to pursue it with a view to the better ordering of our knowledge 

 within our own minds, for sake of the light it might possibly 

 throw on our processes of conscious thought, especially on the 

 mental act of judgment, our study would be logical in character. 

 The latter, therefore, is our point of view at present. 



71. ARISTOTLE S &quot; CATEGORIES &quot;: THE SCHOLASTIC &quot; PRAE- 

 DIC AMENTA.&quot; As a matter of fact, repeated attempts have 

 been made at such a classification, from the days of Aristotle. 

 It is indeed the first problem we encounter in Aristotle s logical 

 treatises (25). His classification terminated in ten highest groups 

 which he called Categories. The word which also gave its title 

 to the treatise in question : ApiaroreXov^ Karryyopiai * is from 

 the verb KaTijryopelv to predicate, to assert (affirm or deny). 2 The 



J The entire treatise KaTyyopiai, Liber de Praedicamentis embraces three 

 parts. It opens with certain preliminary remarks on the names by which we desig 

 nate the things of common knowledge: called &quot; Antcpraedicamenta &quot; (chaps, i.-iii.). 

 Next come the &quot; Categories &quot; or &quot; Praedicamenta,&quot; with a detailed study of their 

 characteristics, especially those of the first four ; for the latter six are but briefly 

 treated (chaps, iv.-ix.). Finally, we have six chapters (x.-xv.) devoted to what are 

 called &quot; Postpraedicamenta &quot;. Aristotle treats, under this head, of certain corollaries 

 which he derives from his classification of the categories, certain concepts whose 

 contents are common to most, if not all, of the categories. Of these notions he enumer 

 ates five : opposition, priority or succession, simultaneity, motion or movement, and 

 attributes expressed by the verb to have : de oppositis, de priori, de sitnul, de nwtu. 

 de habere. With the first of these we have dealt already. The second and third 

 will come up for discussion in connexion with Judgment and with Induction. The 

 fourth and fifth will call for a few remarks in connexion with certain of the cate 

 gories themselves. 



2 The word primarily meant to speak against, to accuse : Karriyopia meaning a 

 charge, an accusation. Legally, the accused person was the subject against whom 

 the heads of accusation, the charges, were preferred : about whom they were made. 

 Transferred to logic, the things that were asserted about the logical subject of the 

 judgment or proposition came to be called categories, heads of predication (Cf. 

 PRANTL, Geschichte d. Logik, i., pp. 184-210). 



