138 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. 



A criticism of Aristotle s treatment of the categories, and a comparison of 

 the same with those of some more modern philosophers, will be better under 

 stood when we have given a brief exposition of the former. 



72. THE CATEGORIES AND THE PREDICABLES. We may, 

 before analysing Aristotle s scheme, call attention to the difference 

 between the predicables (chap, ii.) and the categories. While the 

 former are a classification of all the possible modes of predication, 

 i.e. of all the possible kinds of relation that may exist (in point 

 of intension and in point of extension) between the predicate and 

 the subject of a logical judgment, the latter are a classification 

 of the predicates themselves. The former are a division of logical 

 relations between our direct universal ideas ; the latter are a 

 division of these direct universal ideas themselves. The predicables 

 express not so much the material of thought, but rather certain 

 relations which we see, by reflection, to obtain between our 

 thoughts : logical universal concepts, which are the product of 

 mental reflection on our own direct thoughts and judgments. The 

 categories, being a classification of our direct universal concepts 

 of things, should not be called a classification of &quot;relations&quot;. 

 To describe them as such would expose the student to the risk 

 of confounding them with the predicables. The categories are 

 not primarily a classification of things, but neither are they 

 primarily a classification &quot;of the relations between things&quot;. 1 

 They are a classification of the concepts by means of which, as 

 predicates, we seek to formulate for ourselves and others our 

 knowledge about things. They are therefore a classification of 

 aspects of things, aspects revealed through our concepts, rather 

 than of relations between things. Nor are they a classification 

 of relations between concepts or ideas, as the predicables are. At 

 most they can be said to be such a classification of concepts as 

 necessarily involves relations between the latter ; for they are a 

 classification of concepts considered as predicates, and therefore a,s 

 standing in the relation of predicate to some logical subject. 

 From the very fact that we obtain all our intellectual concepts 

 by an analysis of the data of sense experience, these concepts all 

 embody relations of various kinds to one another. This amount 

 of relativity does enter into the logical classification of the cate 

 gories : they are not classes of things pure and simple, of things 

 considered in their real state, but of things considered as objects 

 of our thought, related by our thought to one another. 

 1 WELTON, Logic, i., p. 89. 



