140 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. 



man do not constitute, appertain essentially to, his nature as man, so his 

 nature as man cannot be regarded as constituting, or as identical with, himself 

 as an individual. Socrates and Plato are not each &quot; human nature,&quot; for if 

 they were they would be identical ; they have human nature. What, then, 

 individuates, or distinguishes numerically, each of them from the other ? This 

 is the metaphysical problem of the Principle of Individuation an aspect of 

 the great, fundamental philosophical question of the relation between the 

 universal and the singular, in our knowledge and in reality itself (4, 5). 1 



About the &quot; this individual thing &quot; we can predicate not merely 

 its substance or essence, as when we say &quot; This is snow &quot; ; we can 

 find other ways of denominating or determining it : we can at 

 tribute certain accessory realities to it commonly called at 

 tributes nowadays, better and somewhat more appropriately 

 known as accidents in Scholastic philosophy. 2 These accidental 

 determinations that may affect an individual substance, Aristotle 

 reduces to nine classes. 



Such terms as white,&quot; &quot;small,&quot; &quot;inferior,&quot; &quot;pushing,&quot; 

 &quot; being beaten,&quot; &quot;at home,&quot; &quot; to-morrow,&quot; &quot; standing,&quot; &quot;armed,&quot; 

 etc., express realities, modes or kinds of being otherwise they 

 could not be used as predicates ; yet they do not express the 

 substance or essence of the individual subject of which they are 

 affirmed, but modes of being that are coincident, or concomitant 

 and co-ordinate, with the mode of being which gives the sub 

 stance of the latter : they are &quot; accidental &quot; or supervening realities. 



Some of the modes of being which may be thus predicated 

 are intrinsic to the individual subject to which they are attributed, 

 are inherent in it : two of them, quantity (TTOCTOV) and quality 

 (TTOIOV), inhere in the subject considered in itself, or absolutely ; 

 a third, relation (777909 TA), is affirmed of the subject when this is 

 regarded in connexion with any thing or things other than 

 itself. Other predicates represent something extrinsic to the 

 subject : place (TTOL)), the measure or determination of quantity, 

 and time (TTOTC), the measure of duration : action (Troieiv) and 

 &quot;passion &quot; (i.e. &quot;being acted on,&quot; endurance, Trda^ecv) which are 

 affirmed of a subject as principle of the former, as term of the 

 latter ; and, finally, the two categories /celaOai and e%6i,i&amp;gt;, usually 



1 Cf. supra, 48, p. 86 ; JOSEPH, Logic, pp. 41-4, 52 b t 67, 76. 



2 Very often the concrete individual thing gets its substantive denomination not 

 from that which is its substance, but from some one or other of the &quot;accidental&quot; 

 categories : when we call a thing a &quot; gate &quot; we do not give its substance (wood or 

 metal), but the form or structure (&quot; quality &quot;) of the latter. Even here, however, the 

 substantive gives what is essential to the notion it conveys about the individual as 

 thus denominated. 



