144 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. 



us in his categories all the possible independent heads under 

 which we may put questions, or seek information, about such 

 objects: (i) What is Socrates? (ii) What size is he? (iii) What 

 sort of man is he ? (iv) How is he related to others ? (v) What 

 is he doing ? (vi) What is being done to him ? (vii) Where is 

 he? (viii) When do you speak of him? (ix) In what posture is 

 he? (x) What is he wearing? 



The last two categories, interpreted in the narrower sense 

 just suggested, can apply practically only to living things, and 

 the last is practically confined to human individuals. They 

 would, in this sense, be more complex or derivative determina 

 tions of place and quality respectively. 1 A wider sense, in which 

 they would be expressed respectively by the intransitive or 

 neuter verb with an active signification, and by the reflexive verb 

 with a passive signification, has been suggested by Max Miiller. 2 



The Greek word tcelo-Oai is not adequately rendered by the 

 Latin Situs, or the English Posture : it may mean state, condition, 

 manner of being ; and, thus interpreted, it may fairly be made to 

 embrace mental states of various kinds sensations, emotions, etc. 

 for which Aristotle is wrongly accused by many moderns 

 Mill and Mansel, 3 for example of having made no provision. 

 Even if such states could not be brought under this category 

 (/celcrOai), they could be included under the categories of 

 Quality, or of Passio : they might fairly be described as TrotoTT/re? 

 or TrdOrj* Furthermore, even if Keladat, were confined to the 

 meaning of Situs or Posture, i.e. relative dispositions of the parts 

 of an individual to the whole, in the place occupied by the latter, 

 this is clearly different from the category TTOV, Ubi at what point 

 of space, whereabouts, is the individual ? with which Mill, in his 

 apparent anxiety to discredit the Aristotelean scheme, confounds 

 the former category. 



The science of philology throws an interesting light on the relation of 

 the remotest known Ianguage-r00/.r to such fundamental concepts as are em 

 bodied in the logical categories. All predicates must be ultimately referred, 

 as we saw, to some individual thing, or phenomenon, or event, which 

 comes into consciousness through the senses. This something the under 

 standing at first most vaguely designates as a subsisting thing, a substance. 

 By repeated efforts it gradually removes the original indeterminateness of 



1 Cf. JOSEPH, op. cit., pp, 38, 47. 



2 Science of Thought (London, Longmans, 1887), P- 43- 



3 WELTON, Logic, i., pp. 95, 97. 



*GROTE, Aristotle, apud WELTON, Logic, i., p. 98. 



