1 6a THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. 



of, the predication ; and to change the time is really to change the predicate, 

 and so to change the whole judgment. The truth of a judgment, therefore, 

 is not independent of &quot;time in predication,&quot; and, consequently, &quot;what is true 

 to-day may be false to-morrow &quot;. That &quot; Ireland has a native Parliament &quot; is 

 false of to-day, though it was true of the eighteenth century and may be true 

 again of some future date. But this judgment like every other such judg 

 ment is not fully expressed unless the time referred to is explicitly predi 

 cated ; and when this is done the judgment so formulated is true for ever, 

 independently of the time at which it is formulated independently of the 

 &quot; time of predication &quot;. Thus, it always was, and still is, and ever will be 

 true, that &quot; In the eighteenth century Ireland had a native Parliament &quot; : Once 

 true, true for ever. Similarly it is &quot; once false, false for ever &quot; that &quot; Ireland 

 had a native Parliament throughout the nineteenth century &quot;. 



Yet another corollary from the objectivity of judgment is its peculiar in 

 dependence of our wish or will. We are conscious that if at any instant we 

 are to judge truly about any matter, we cannot judge just as we please. Not 

 indeed that we cannot gradually so choose and regulate our intellectual 

 surroundings and influences as finally to modify our beliefs, thus making the 

 wish &quot; father to the thought &quot; : but that at any given instant what is true 

 is not determined by us, but is rather determined for us, by that objective 

 sphere of reality which our judgment seeks to interpret. 



81. MATTER AND FORM OF THE JUDGMENT: ITS &quot; AB 

 STRACT &quot; CHARACTER. The matter of the judgment is the reality 

 about which we judge, and is embodied in the two concepts com 

 pared, the subject and predicate. The connexion made by the 

 copula between these two elements, the interpreted and&amp;gt; the 

 interpreting, is called the form of the judgment. It is because 

 the form remains the same while the matter may vary, that we 

 are able to build up a general science of logic about our thinking 

 processes (10, 17). But it would be a mistake to imagine that 

 the form is wholly independent of the matter, or can be studied 

 entirely apart from the latter in a &quot; purely formal logic &quot;. To a 

 certain extent, the modes in which we think and judge about 

 things depend upon the nature of the things themselves : there are 

 varieties of modes or forms in our thinking processes, and it is the 

 duty of logic to attempt an analysis of all these. The form of the 

 judgment, the mode of connexion between two elements of our 

 thought in the interpretation of any thing, or portion of reality, 

 is not necessarily the same in all cases. In a hypothetical judg 

 ment, for instance, &quot; If any S is M, it is P,&quot; each of the two 

 elements of thought connected together is already complex, &quot; S is 

 M&quot; being one, &quot;S is P&quot; being the other, and the mode of con 

 nexion is not the same as in the categorical judgment, &quot; S is 

 M &quot;. In other words, though the general form of judgment is 



