NATURE OF THE JUDGMENT AND PROPOSITION. 163 



the same throughout all judgments, viz. a synthesis of two ele 

 ments of thought, this general form assumes a variety of modes, 

 which will be studied in subsequent chapters ; and this variety of 

 modes must be accounted for, in ultimate analysis, as due to the 

 variety of ways in which reality presents itself to our minds for 

 interpretation. 1 



Again, it is impossible to separate the treatment of the mental 

 act from that of its verbal expression the judgment from the 

 proposition. Nor is it desirable to treat the process of judgment 

 separately, in logic, as it should be treated in psychology : for 

 logic deals not with the process of formation of thought, but with 

 the finished mental product ; and this can be seized in its most 

 exact and definite shape only in its verbal expression, the pro 

 position. At the same time, it must be remembered that language 

 is not a perfect instrument for the expression of actual thought ; 

 just as actual thought itself rarely if ever reaches the ideal of 

 accuracy which logic, as a normative science, sets up for it. Logic 

 deals with mental processes as they ought to be, not as unfortun 

 ately they more usually are. Again, it abstracts what may be 

 called the &quot;dry bones,&quot; the purely representative elements, the 

 truth and falsity aspects, from the warm, living, palpitating, mental 

 process, ignoring all the vital, emotional colouring of the latter. 2 

 Nay, even some of the truth and falsity aspects themselves are, of 

 necessity, ignored by logic : all those subtle, delicate, semi-con 

 scious movements of thought which exercise such an immense and 

 undoubted influence on our convictions, are largely beyond its 

 usual scope. Perhaps the larger part of those practical, ordinary, 

 everyday assents and inferences, by which our conduct in life is 

 shaped, are the outcome of such complex, manifold, half un 

 conscious influences as could not possibly find adequate expression 

 in any number of propositions, or of exactly formulated arguments. 



Logic is sometimes called an abstract science for this reason, that the 

 judgments and other thought processes with which it deals are divested, as it 

 were, of the clothing they have in individual minds, and are common, typical 

 of a class, falling short of a complete representation of any such process in 

 individuo. This, however, calls for two remarks. Firstly, it is as true of 

 every other science as it is of logic: &quot;Just as thought is abstract [in all 

 the sciences] in its dealings with reality, so logic is abstract in its dealings 

 with ordinary thought &quot;. a Secondly, those necessary limitations of the scope 



*Cf. JOSEPH, op. cit., pp. 143, 153 ; also pp. 5-7. 



2 C/. NEWMAN, Grammar of Assent, pp. 266-7. 



3 HOBHOUSE, Theory of Knowledge, p. 7; apud KBYNES, op. c\t., p. 69, 



II * 



