1 64 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. 



of logic must not be interpreted as they sometimes are wrongly interpreted 

 in the sense of a reproach. They do not detract from the value and utility 

 of logic, or from its claim to be the sole science which examines thought 

 processes as means to the acquiring of truth. Writers who, like Cardinal 

 Newman in his Grammar of Assent, devote special attention to the study of 

 those multitudinous mental influences which are so evasive and intangible as 

 to defy adequate expression in the stereotyped moulds of traditional logic, 

 are inclined, naturally enough, to emphasize the shortcomings of the latter 

 discipline ; but it must not be forgotten that the difference between the fully 

 conscious and the semi-conscious is one of degree, not of kind : that man 

 has not two reasoning faculties, but one : that the processes of conception, 

 judgment, inference, as leading to truth or error, must be tested at one and 

 the same bar of Rational Reflection, and according to one and the same code 

 of Logical Laws ; that there is no such thing as a &quot; logic of real life,&quot; at 

 variance with, or even distinct from, the &quot; notional logic &quot; that has been 

 built up by centuries of attention to the mental processes by which we attain 

 to the knowledge of truth. 



82. INTERPRETATION OF TERMS AND OF PROPOSITIONAL 

 FORMS: FORMULATION: &quot;MEANING&quot; AND &quot; IMPLICATIONS &quot; 

 OF THE PROPOSITION. The proposition being the verbal expres 

 sion of some truth which is mentally expressed in the judgment ; 

 ordinary language, too, being so often ambiguous and uncertain 

 in its meaning ; and, furthermore, what is practically the same truth 

 being capable of equally exact expression in various forms of 

 statement : we shall obviously be obliged, in the first place, to 

 fix definitely the meaning we are to attach to the forms of ex 

 pression that enter most frequently into logical propositions ; and 

 in the second place, to examine those among the ordinary forms 

 of verbal statement or proposition which lend themselves most 

 easily and most successfully to the logical treatment of the mental 

 fact itself, the judgment. 



For instance, in the traditional scheme of propositions, All S 

 is P, No S is P, Some S is P, and Some S is not P, the inter 

 pretation of the meaning or import of each form will evidently 

 depend on the exact meaning we assign to the terms &quot;#//,&quot; &quot;0,&quot; 

 &quot; some &quot;. And again, we may inquire whether, perhaps, besides 

 the traditional scheme of propositions just referred to, we might 

 not find other schemes of great logical utility, to which all ordinary 

 statements might possibly be reduced : such, for instance, as the 

 Existential Scheme &quot; 5 exists [S &amp;gt; O] &quot; and &quot; S does not exist 

 [S = O] &quot; into which many statements will be found to fall 

 more naturally than into the traditional scheme (I23). 1 



1 e.g. God exists. Thire arc no such things as fairies. It is raining. The 

 Resurrection of Christ is an historical fact. Cf. KEYNES, op. cit., p. 218. 



