1 7 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. 



An alternative * judgment is one which asserts that one or other 

 of two (or more) simple judgments is true. 



A remotive judgment is one which denies, or removes, or abol 

 ishes, the alternative altogether, by denying that any single member 

 of the latter is true. 



The division of compound judgments into six members is not the only 

 one possible. We find it the most convenient, though it is not at all perfect. 

 The distinctions are much more fundamental in some cases than in others. 

 Besides, the distinction between the first and second member of each pair 

 [(i) and (2)] is a distinction which is based on quality; the latter distinc 

 tion, however, carries with it, in these cases, far weightier consequences than 

 when applied to the simple categorical judgment. It will be noted, further, 

 that the members arrived at on the first three grounds of division (quality, 

 quantity, modality] are illustrated symbolically by categorical propositions. 

 It is in their application to categoricals only that we shall examine these dis 

 tinctions in the present and immediately following chapters. 



85. &quot;NECESSARY&quot; AND &quot;CONTINGENT&quot; JUDGMENTS, WITH 

 THEIR SYNONYMS. We have divided judgments into modal and 

 non-modal ; and the former into &quot;necessary&quot; and &quot;contingent&quot;. 

 This latter distinction is the one which really underlies the modal 

 distinction of propositions into &quot; apodeictic &quot; and &quot; problematic,&quot; 

 as interpreted below (89). We purpose to examine it here. It 

 arises directly out of the study of the predicables and definition 

 (43-57)5 an d it is not understood in the same way by all. 

 The nomenclature, too, of the members of the division has 

 undergone considerable variation. The Schoolmen spoke in 

 differently of (a) the propositio PER SE NOTA and the propositio 

 PER ALIUD NOTA ; (ff) the modus dicendi (or propositio or enunciatid] 

 PER SE (icaff avro), and the modus dicendi (or propositio or enun- 

 ciatio] PER ACCIDENS (icara a-vfji^e^Ko^) ; (&amp;lt;:) the proposition or 

 judgment in materia necessaria, and the proposition or judgment 

 in materia contingenti ; (d) the metaphysical and the physical 

 judgment ; (e) the pure or rational, and the empiric or experimental 

 judgment ; while modern writers speak of (/) the analytic and 

 the synthetic proposition ; (g) the a priori and the a posteriori pro 

 position ; (Ji) the verbal and the real proposition ; (i) the essential 

 and the accidental proposition ; (J) the explicative and the ampli- 

 ative or instructive or augmentative proposition. 2 



All those various couples are meant to express with certain 

 shades of difference the same broad distinction ; and we may at 



1 Commonly called disjunctive also. 2 Cf. VENN, op. cit., p. 291. 



