KINDS OF JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS. 181 



The simple assertion, apart from the mode, was called by the Scholastics 

 the dictum : the modal proposition was fully and properly expressed when 

 the mode was predicated of the dictum, e.%. &quot; That the human soul is im 

 mortal is necessary impossible contingent possible &quot; (propositio modalis 

 &quot; de dicto &quot;). It could be also stated, though less explicitly, by using the mode 

 adverbially in making our predication about the original subject or thing 

 (Res\ e.g. &quot;The human soul is necessarily impossibly contingently 

 possibly mortal &quot; (propositio modalis &quot; de re &quot;). 



The Scholastics also distinguish material from formal modality. Any 

 adjectival or adverbial mode that qualified the subject, or predicate, gives rise 

 to a materially modal proposition,&quot; e.g. &quot; He ^occasionally angry &quot;. This 

 modality is of no logical importance. Formal QI logical modality is produced 

 by a mode which qualifies, not the subject, nor the predicate, but the copula of 

 the judgment. 



By the modality of a judgment we therefore understand, 

 with Aristotle and the Scholastics, the necessary or contingent 

 character of the relation seen by the mind to exist between 

 subject and predicate. Combined with the distinction based on 

 quality, it gives rise to four forms of categoricals : 5 must be P, 

 S cannot be P, S may be P, and 5 need not be P ; but, taken in 

 itself it is twofold : apodeictic, which asserts necessary agreement 

 or disagreement, and problematic, which tts&te possible agreement 

 or disagreement, of P with S. The apodeictic form expresses 

 what must be or cannot be an affirmative or negative necessity 

 the problematic, what may be or need not be an affirmative or 

 negative possibility or contingency. 1 



Understood in this way, the modality of the judgment is objective, not 

 subjective: whether the relation between subject and predicate be a neces 

 sary one or not, depends entirely on the intension of the subject and predicate 

 themselves, the material elements of the judgment. In fact, the modal pro 

 position makes explicit the distinction explained above (8 5 -88) between the essen 

 tial and the accidental judgment. The apodeictic proposition is the modal 

 (and natural) expression of the judgment in materia necessaria ; and the prob 

 lematic proposition, of the judgment in materia contingenti. It would carry 

 us too far into the sphere of metaphysics to discuss in any adequate way the 

 nature and grounds of the distinction between the necessary or apodeictic 

 judgment, the contingent or problematic judgment, and the simple or assertoric 

 judgment. 2 But a few remarks will help to illustrate the matter. 



to change our judgment from &quot; S is P &quot; to &quot; S may perhaps be P &quot;. On this mode 

 of expressing a doubt, see below, 90. 



1 Contingency in reference to modality means simply non-necessity. A contin 

 gent modal is simply a possible modal (S may be P, S need not be P). A simple or 

 non-modal proposition which expresses some contingent fact ; e.g. &quot; The boys are 

 playing,&quot; is sometimes called a contingent proposition, because it expresses some 

 thing that is de facto, but might have been otherwise. 



2 Cf. the discussions on the problematic judgment in JOSEPH S Logic, pp. 177 

 sqq. The author propounds the subjective view mentioned below (90). 



