184 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC. 



This is unsatisfactory. There is, of course, a plain connexion 

 between it and the objective interpretation of modality in so far 

 as our assent is due to intrinsic evidence springing from an analy 

 sis of the essence or comprehension of the objects of our concepts. 

 The firmness of our subjective assent should be in proportion to 

 the objective evidence for the judgment. Where the judgment 

 is seen to be apodeictic in the objective sense, i.e. where there 

 is seen to be an absolutely necessary connexion (of agreement 

 or disagreement) between 5 and P, the evidence will be cogent 

 and the assent will be most firm. But the modal form (must ; 

 must nof) expresses rather the necessity of the relation, not the 

 certitude of the mental assent. Absolute certitude of assent can 

 also be had on grounds of experience for assertoric judgments, of 

 the form 5 is P, irrespective of the necessity or contingency of 

 the relation between the attributes S and P. The distinction 

 between the forms, 5 must (or must nof) be P, and ^S is (or is nof] P, 

 is useless as a means of measuring the degree of our mental 

 assent. The estimation of the latter must be left to the Logic of 

 Probability, where it will find more exact and adequate expres 

 sion than Kant s threefold distinction can give it. Ordinary 

 logic, in regarding the assertoric categorical proposition, 5 is 

 P, or S is not P, as the assertion of an objective truth (80), 

 assumes that it can be assented to with certitude, that its truth 

 can be verified ; but does not concern itself with the attitude of 

 this or that individual s mind towards the judgment which is the 

 mental expression of that truth. 



Moreover, on no view of modality can the assertoric categorical 

 judgment be classed as one of the members of the modal division. 

 If its equivalent be sought in the objective modal scheme, it will 

 be apodeictic or problematic according to the necessary or contin 

 gent character of the relation between the attributes of 5 and P ; 

 and on \h^ subjective view of modality, it will, presumably, be apo 

 deictic if we are certain of it and problematic if we are not. 



But neither is the form of the problematic * modal proposition 

 a satisfactory expression of mental doubt. The modal form, 5 

 may (or need nof} be P, is ambiguous. It may be interpreted to 

 mean, and indeed very often does mean, and express, simply and 



1 The terms &quot; problematic &quot; and &quot; apodeictic &quot; do, indeed, suggest doubt and 

 certitude respectively, and have probably arisen in connexion with the present view. 

 But, without adopting the latter, we may retain the names as synonymous with the 

 older terms &quot; necessary &quot; (or &quot; impossible &quot;) and &quot; contingent&quot; (or &quot; possible &quot;). 



