KINDS OF JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS. 185 



solely mental doubt, or uncertainty, about the judgments 5 is P 

 and 5 is not P ; but if this be taken as the import of the form 

 in question, it expresses no logical judgment at all about 5 and P, 

 but merely the absence of a judgment about them. It reveals 

 indeed the actual state of the thinker s mind, and may involve 

 or suggest the existence of a judgment in his mind about the 

 strength of the evidence * ; but it expresses no mental assertion 

 of an objective truth (80) about 5 in terms of P. Interpreted, there 

 fore, as the mere expression of a subjective uncertainty, it is not 

 in itself the expression of any distinct judgment of which ordinary 

 logic, at all events, can take cognizance. It must, therefore, be 

 interpreted if a meaning is to be given to it at all as denying 

 the objective truth of the corresponding apodeictic judgment, S 

 must (or cannot} be P, i.e. as asserting that there is no absolutely 

 necessary relation between 5 and P. 2 In addition to the informa 

 tion it gives us about its subject, 5, we take it to be no part of 

 its meaning to give us any information about the degree of assent 

 demanded from us by the judgment 5 is (or is not) P? It may 

 demand for itself full assent. Logic, in so far as it assumes 

 judgments to be true, and analyses what further implications are 

 contained in them, tacitly assumes at the same time that every 

 true judgment is held by the mind with certitude. Or rather, we 

 may say, it abstracts from this question. If, therefore, the form 

 &quot; 5 may (or need not) be P&quot; is to be regarded as a distinct pro- 

 position, expressing in itself an objective truth, it must be inter 

 preted objectively -, as referring to the objective relation between 5 

 and P, not subjectively, as referring to our mental attitude of doubt 

 (or otherwise) towards that relation. 4 



JOYCE, Logic, 51-54, 58-61. KEYNES, Logic, pp. 49-56. WELTON, Logic, 

 i., pp. 160, 161. JOSEPH, Logic, pp. 185-190. VENN, Empirical Logic, pp. 

 291 sqq. MELLONE,i//&amp;gt;W. Text-Book of Logic, pp. 367 sqq. 



1 Cf. n. 4 . 



2 C/. SIGWART, Logic (tr. DENDY), i., pp. 178 sqq. 3 C/. n. 4. 



4 This latter is the judgment it expresses for those who take the subjective view 

 of modality : &quot; In every judgment I intend to assert truth, but not necessarily about 

 the particular reality that my judgment refers to ; the truth I assert may be that I 

 am unable to discover the truth about this reality&quot; (JOSEPH, op. cit., p. 182). The 

 proposition &quot; S may (or need not) be P &quot; would then mean &quot; I am uncertain whether 

 the judgment S is P is true or not &quot;. &quot; If I find the content of a suggested judgment 

 involved in conditions about which I am uncertain, I assert it to be possible ; such a 

 judgment is called problematic and expressed in the form X may (or may not) be 

 &quot;(**.). 



