CA TEGORICAL JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS. 213 



claiming as explicitly thought in the act of judgment what is not really so. 

 He quantifies the predicate explicitly in all propositions because he contends 

 that, psychologically, in all our judgments we think of the quantity or exten 

 sion of the predicate : &quot; in thought the predicate is always quantified &quot;. This 

 is notoriously untrue. A simple appeal to consciousness will assure us 

 that far more frequently we think of the intension of the predicate in our 

 judgments, not of its extension. When we are told that &quot;All . s are B s &quot; 

 so far are we from spontaneously thinking the meaning to be All A s are 

 some B s,&quot; that at first it is only by an effort we realise this is so, 

 even when we are assured that it is. When the learner is told that the pro 

 position &quot; All A s are B s &quot; cannot be simply converted to &quot;All B s are A s,&quot; 

 but only to &quot; some B s are A s,&quot; he is told a thing that he may never before 

 have explicitly adverted to ; and which, perhaps, he will not grasp fully 

 until he works on some familiar example like &quot;All men are animals&quot; : 

 &quot; Some animals are men &quot;. 



107. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE QUANTIFICATION DOCTRINE. 

 Notwithstanding the unsoundness of its psychological basis, &quot; Quantification 

 of the Predicate &quot; was regarded by many as a means of bringing about quite 

 a wonderful simplification of logical processes. It was expounded and 

 applied by Dr. Baynes in his New Analytic of Logical Forms. It promised 

 great things ; but it was found to simplify practically nothing. Baynes con 

 tended, in defence of it, that we cannot have intelligible predication without 

 quantifying the predicate ; and, that, furthermore, the quantitative relation 

 established must in all cases be determinate. &quot; If this relation,&quot; he writes, 

 &quot; were indeterminate if we were uncertain whether it was of part, or whole, 

 or none there could be no predication.&quot; * &quot;This is perfectly true,&quot; replies 

 Dr. Keynes, 2 &quot; so long as we are left with all three of these alternatives : but 

 we may have predication which involves the elimination of only one of them, 

 so that there is still indeterminateness as regards the other two.&quot; This 

 latter, in fact, is the predication which expresses &quot; the very common state of 

 doubt, when we know that every S is P but do not know whether or not any 

 other objects are P as well &quot; ; 3 and when we do express such a judgment in 

 the explicitly quantified form, &quot;All S s are some P s,&quot; the word &quot; some &quot; bears 

 the traditional indefinite meaning, &quot; some, possibly all &quot;. But the Hamilton- 

 ian scheme gives no form for expressing this very common state of doubt, or 

 partial knowledge, about a class, if it expresses only quantitative relations be 

 tween definite or determinate classes : 4 for in doing this latter we must take 

 the word &quot;some &quot; to mean &quot;a definite, determined portion, not all.&quot; 



And then, furthermore, if we do take &quot; some &quot; in this latter sense so that 

 in all cases we must have a definite knowledge of the relative extent of two 

 classes, before comparing them in judgment we ought to reach & fivefold, 

 rather than an eightfold scheme of propositions : there being only five 

 alternatives in the actual quantitative relations of two classes (104). 



Thus we see that the scheme is at once defective and redundant. There 

 is, moreover, a wide divergence of view among Hamilton s disciples as to 

 the proper interpretation to be given to &quot; some &quot; : and a scarcely less 



*apud KEYNES, op. cit. t p. 197. 2 ibid., p, 199. 



3 WELTON, Logic, p. 200. 4 Cf. KEYNES, op. cit., p. 203. 



