25 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 



attributes of which we think must be possible, conceivable, thinkable, free from 

 logical contradiction. They must belong to the sphere of OBJECTIVELY 

 POSSIBLE things. Here is a kind of &quot;existence,&quot; namely &quot;logical exist 

 ence &quot; or &quot; conceivability,&quot; which is inseparably bound up with every term, 

 and therefore implied in every judgment. 



Every judgment, therefore, implies the actual existence of the objects or 

 attributes denoted or connoted by its terms, in the sphere of logical conceiva 

 bility. Nor do even such judgments as &quot; Round squares are impossible &quot; 

 form a real exception to this statement ; for they do not deny the existence of 

 the objects or attributes &quot; squares, circles, round,&quot; etc., but only of attempted 

 combinations of the latter, within the sphere of logical possibility. In 

 order that a number of attributes be synthesized by the individual mind so 

 as to form one object of thought, and so exist as one object in the sphere of 

 objective possibility, they must be mutually compatible, free from mutual 

 contradiction. Hence, although all our concepts, without exception, refer us 

 to some portion or other of the actual, physical universe whence we derived 

 them through our senses in the first instance (i, 2, 4) still, when used in 

 judgments, they sometimes refer us more directly, for the verification of the 

 latter, to the sphere of objective possibility. For example, the concepts 

 &quot;matter,&quot; &quot;spirit,&quot; &quot;square,&quot; &quot;circle,&quot; &quot;quadruped,&quot; &quot;two-legged,&quot; 

 &quot;twice,&quot; &quot;four,&quot; &quot;ten,&quot; are all derived from our experience of the actual 

 physical universe in which we live ; but it is directly to the sphere of what is 

 possible that we are referred by the judgments &quot; matter and spirit are identi 

 cal,&quot; &quot; no square can be circular,&quot; &quot; some quadrupeds are two-legged &quot; 

 &quot; twice four are ten,&quot; for the grounds of their truth or falsity. 



This sphere of the purely possible is conceived by us to comprehend 

 the ideal types (whether known or unknown to us) of every thought-object 

 that is capable of existing in any department of actual reality. It is a real 

 sphere, in the sense that it is not a mere creation of our mental activity. 

 Possible things are possible, not because we conceive them in our thought ; 

 but, rather, we can conceive them in our thought because they are possible. 

 Why they are possible, what makes them possible, what is the ultimate ground 

 of their possibility is not for logic, but for metaphysics, to decide. At all 

 events, what guides us in determining what is intrinsically possible or conceiv 

 able, and what not, is our acquaintance with actual reality. And since this is 

 so, we must hold that all judgments even those which can be verified by a 

 reference to what is contained in the compared concepts themselves, i.e. by a 

 reference to the sphere of possibility or conceivability icfer us beyond 

 this to some portion or department of actual reality. 



124. MEANING OF INQUIRY AS TO EXISTENTIAL IMPORT. 

 The question, therefore, which we have now to propose is this : 

 whether every categorical judgment, besides referring us to some 

 such sphere of actual reality, implies also, as part of its import, 

 that the objects compared in the judgment actually exist or occur 

 in that department in addition to their being present in the 

 sphere of the logically possible or thinkable. 



It is one thing that the objects with which we deal in our 



