CA TEGORICAL JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS 25 1 



use of terms and propositions should, besides having an ex 

 istence as objects of thought in the sphere of the thinkable, also 

 refer us to some sphere or realm of the actual, in which the 

 truth of our judgments about these objects may be tested ; it 

 is another question altogether whether the various categorical 

 judgments which we make about those objects imply, or do not 

 imply, that those objects actually exist in those realms. This latter 

 is the question with which we are at present concerned. We 

 cannot, of course, use a term intelligibly except in reference to 

 some universe of discourse, i.e. some sphere of actual reality ; but 

 this does not oblige us to suppose that the object it represents 

 actually exists in this, or indeed in any other, universe of discourse. 1 

 For instance, the proposition, There are no such things as unicorns, 

 while referring us to the visible, material universe, expressly denies 

 the existence of its subject in that universe : although unicorns 

 do exist in another universe that of heraldry. In discussing 

 the existential import of a judgment our first duty, therefore, is 

 to determine with certainty to what universe of discourse the 

 judgment refers us. No general rule can be laid down for deter 

 mining this, but there will be scarcely ever any doubt or am 

 biguity about it. It will easily be gathered from the context. 

 Where subject and predicate would naturally suggest different 

 spheres, the probability is that it is in reference to the sphere of 

 the subject the assertion is made. In inference, a tacit change of 

 the sphere of reference of the judgment would cause fallacy. For 

 example, in converting &quot; Some witches are old women &quot; to &quot; Some 

 old women are witches &quot; both propositions must be referred to the 

 same sphere. Where there is any ambiguity it must be removed ; 

 for unless we know the universe to which the judgment refers us, 

 we cannot be said to understand the judgment. 



And when we ask the question whether a given judgment implies that 

 the objects denoted by its terms exist in the universe referred to, it must not 

 be thought that we are raising any question about the ultimate nature either 

 of &quot; existence &quot; in general, or of the universe in question. For, although 

 there may be, and always has been, much controversy among philosophers, 

 and indeed among all thinking men, about the nature of these various objec 

 tive spheres : whether, for instance, the sphere of &quot; spiritual &quot; beings, as 

 distinct from visible, material things, is a mere creation of human beliefs like 



1 If the direct reference of the term or judgment is to the sphere of the purely 

 possible or conceivable (in which case there is always the further reference beyond 

 this, to the actual}, then the object signified will actually exist in this possible sphere 

 unless it be an impossible object such as &quot; square circle,&quot; etc. 



