CONDITIONAL JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS 265 



the categorical proposition just given is different from the logical subject of 

 the &quot;*/&quot;&quot; judgment. Indeed, in the latter we have two judgments compared, 

 instead of two concepts ; and this we saw to be the criterion of distinction 

 between the simple and the compound judgment (84) : corresponding to sub 

 ject and predicate in the simple judgment or, rather, analogous to them we 

 have here antecedent and consequent. 



The consequent is somehow dependent on the antecedent : but 

 if we ask how exactly ? or what is the relation between the two 

 simple judgments A and C, or between W is X and Y is Z in 

 the judgment &quot; If W is X, Y is Z&quot; where we give full symbolic 

 expression to all the terms? or whether all such judgments, 

 even though they contain four distinct terms, may be reduced to 

 the form in which antecedent and consequent have the same 

 logical subject, the form &quot; If S is M it is P&quot; ? when we ask these 

 questions and endeavour to answer them by the study of examples, 

 we shall find that there is room to draw a distinction between 

 two great classes of these &quot; if&quot; judgments ; although the ulti 

 mate grounds of the distinction may not be at first quite clear. 



133. Two CLASSES OF &quot;!F&quot; JUDGMENTS, THE &quot; CONDI 

 TIONAL&quot; AND THE &quot;HYPOTHETICAL&quot;. Examples of one class 

 would be the following : If a child is spoilt, its parents suffer ; if 

 the government is good, the people are happy ; if the barometer falls, 

 we shall have rain ; if a lighted match is applied to gunpowder, 

 there will be an explosion ; if employers and workmen disagree, 

 the trade of the country will be injured ; if a triangle be inscribed 

 in a semi-circle, it will be right-angled ; if a triangle be right- 

 angled, the square on its hypotenuse will be equal to the sum of the 

 squares on the other two sides. 



The main characteristics of this class of judgments are (i) that 

 they connect two events, or \wvgroups of properties, so that &quot; when 

 ever&quot; &quot;wherever&quot; &quot;as often as&quot; &quot;in all cases in which&quot; ^ we 

 have the first, we have the second ; (2) that the consequents, if taken 

 apart and expressed fully, have not a complete import of their 

 own, but refer us back inevitably, for the full understanding of 

 them, to the antecedents ; (3) that they can be easily reduced to 

 the form &quot; If S is M it is P&quot; in which the four original terms (if 



subject we may think about. And to exclude it from Logic on the ground that, as 

 compared with the common form of assertion in both, it is material, only shows 

 the impossibility of making Logic a purely formal science. It is claiming to consider 

 the genus and refusing to consider the species : a procedure which would be tolerated 

 in no other science, and cannot be tolerated in Logic.&quot; JOSEPH, ibid. 



1 All these expressions may be substituted for &quot; if&quot; in the conditional judgment. 



