CONDITIONAL JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS 273 



A If a swan is not white it is black. 



E If a man is wicked he is not wise. 



I If a story is believed it is sometimes true. 



O Sometimes if a man kills another he is not a criminal. 



How far categoricals can be inferred from conditionals, and 

 vice versa, depends on how we interpret each form in regard to 

 modality and existential import (135). Apart from implications 

 of existence, the assertoric universal can be inferred from the apo- 

 deictic, but not vice versa, whether we are dealing with two cate 

 goricals, two conditionals, or one of each ; while, on the other 

 hand, the problematic proposition may be inferred from the asser 

 toric particular, but not vice versa. 



138. HYPOTHETICAL PROPOSITIONS : THEIR MODAL IMPORT. 

 Since pure hypothetical judgments do not differ fundamentally 

 from conditionals (133), we need not re-examine the relation of the 

 former to categoricals. We have seen that their reduction to the 

 categorical form of proposition is more difficult than in the case of 

 conditionals : that, in fact, instead of reducing them to categorical 

 form, we rather substitute a now judgment, categorical in form, 

 differing in import from the hypothetical itself, and having for its 

 import what was only an implication of the latter a statement 

 about the latent grounds or conditions of the predication con 

 tained in the consequent of the latter. The hypothetical, If A 

 then C, would yield the categorical : The reality about which the 

 assertion A is made is such that the assertion C is also \de facto\ 

 true [or, must necessarily be true\ about that reality. 



The alternatives here offered as the import of this latter judg 

 ment suggest at once the possibility of a twofold interpretation 

 of the hypothetical, If A then C. Does this proposition merely 

 mean that A is a judgment with whose truth the falsity of C is 

 de facto incompatible, or does it mean that A is a judgment, from 

 the truth of which the truth of C is a necessary consequence ? Does 

 it mean &quot; If A is true then C is de facto true,&quot; or does it mean 

 &quot;If A is true then C must be true&quot;? Does it merely deny the 

 actual conjunction of C false with A true, or does it deny the 

 possibility of such conjunction ? In other words, is it assertoric, or 

 is it modal? The difference between the two interpretations will 

 be evident at once, if we are asked to contradict the proposition 

 &quot; If A then C&quot;. If it only denies the actual conjunction of not-C 

 with A, we contradict it by the proposition &quot; A is true but C is 

 false or &quot; A but not C,&quot; which affirms that actual conjunction. 

 VOL. I. 1 8 



