THE DOCTRINE OF REDUCTION 347 



ments in which the middle term is singular, or entirely definite in 

 quantity ; more particularly if the other terms are general. The 

 reason is, that in the third figure the middle term is twice subject, 

 and the singular term is naturally subject of the proposition in 

 which it occurs if the other term is general (81). For instance, 

 it would be impossible to express the argument &quot; Socrates is wise, 

 Socrates is a philosopher, therefore, Some philosophers are wise so 

 appropriately in any other figure as in the figure (and mood, 

 Darapti] in which it stands, (d) It has been called the inductive 

 figure, because it expresses the mental process whereby we seek, 

 by adducing or enumerating instances [of M\ to establish some 

 connexion between attributes or features [S and P\ observed to 

 be characteristic of these instances : and Induction is the general 

 name of the process by which we establish universal truths from 

 the facts of our experience. 5 and P, therefore, are general 

 characteristics : in the premisses we either affirm both, or affirm 

 one and deny the other, of the same M s : and thereby we seek, 

 in the conclusion, to establish a connexion, affirmative or negative, 

 between 5 and P : but, of course, the connexion cannot be a 

 universal one : no mere enumeration of instances, in which .S and 

 P are (or are not) found together (in M\ will warrant us in 

 stating that 5 must always and necessarily be (or not be) P ; all 

 we can conclude is that S may be (or need not be) P : but this 

 particular conclusion in addition to disproving the universal 

 opposite : &quot; 5 cannot be (or must be) P &quot; has the merit of suggest 

 ing, as worthy of investigation, the hypothesis that the universal 

 conclusion, &quot; S must be (or cannot be) P&quot; is perhaps true. 



If the particular conclusion of the third figure, &quot; Some S s are (or are 

 not) P,&quot; be understood modally, as just suggested, i.e. as meaning that &quot; S is 

 (at least) compatible with the presence (or absence) of P,&quot; it matters not 

 whether the middle term be one single M, or some M s, known to be the 

 same in both premisses, whether the number be definite or indefinite, or 

 all M s universally : the ground for arguing compatibility is equally strong in 

 the case of one instance properly observed, of course as in the case of 

 several. But if we seek to discover more than mere compatibility, if we sus 

 pect a necessary connexion, between 5 and P (or the absence of P\ then the 

 probability of such a connexion will, no doubt, depend upon the number of 

 instances examined, though it will depend far more upon the nature of the 

 instances, and of the attributes compared. The &quot; case of the cow in my 

 paddock &quot; gives me the same ground for concluding that possessing horns, 

 or cloven feet, is compatible with chewing the cud, as an indefinite number of 

 such cases would furnish. But if there is question of collecting evidence for 

 my suspicion that &quot; all cloven-footed animals ruminate,&quot; fifty cows would 



