ABRIDGED AND CONJOINED SYLLOGISMS 379 



suppressed except the first, and all the conclusions (which are 

 identical with these majors) are suppressed except the last. This 

 form, in which each syllogism proves the (suppressed) major of 

 the succeeding one, and in which the first expressed proposi 

 tion is a major premiss and all the remaining expressed pro 

 positions (except the last) are minor premisses, is called the 

 GOCLENIAN SORITES. 



In the second form, (b\ it will be noted that all the minor 

 premisses are suppressed except the -first, and all the conclusions 

 (which are identical with these minors) are suppressed except the 

 last. In this form, too, the minor premisses are written before 

 the majors; but this is an immaterial point (148). This second 

 form, in which each syllogism proves the (suppressed) minor of 

 the succeeding one, and in which the first expressed proposition 

 is a minor premiss and all the remaining expressed propositions 

 (except the last) are major premisses, is called the ARISTOTELEAN 

 (or ORDINARY) SORITES. 



The Goclenian sorites is so called from Goclenius (1547-1628), a pro 

 fessor of Marburg, who first drew attention to it in a commentary on Aristotle s 

 Organon. The Aristotelean is called after Aristotle, though it is nowhere 

 treated by him. Nor was the term Sorites used by Aristotle. He refers 

 but vaguely to the form of reasoning we are at present considering (An. Post, 

 a. xiv. 79 a , 20, xx.-xxiii.). It was first treated expressly by the Stoics, and first 

 called the Sorites by Cicero. 1 But it was not till long afterwards that this 

 name came to be generally used in its present sense. The term sorites 

 (o-vpos, a heap) was, indeed, used, but in quite a different sense, by the Greek 

 philosophers. With them it denoted a certain form of fallacy based on the 

 difficulty of assigning the exact limits of a concept. For example, &quot; Does 

 one grain of corn make a heap?&quot; &quot;No.&quot; &quot;Do two?&quot; &quot;No.&quot; &quot;Do 

 three ? &quot; &quot;No &quot;... &quot; Do three thousand ?&quot;...&quot; But the addition of 

 any one grain does not change into a heap what was not a heap ? &quot; . . . 

 &quot; Therefore either three thousand grains do not, or one grain does, make a 

 heap ? &quot; It was called the Calvus (bald) in this example : &quot; Does pulling 

 one, . . . two, . . . three, etc. . . . hairs from a man s head make him 

 bald ? &quot; A similar fallacy arises from such questions as : &quot; On what day 

 does a lamb become a sheep ? &quot; It is sometimes confounded with a some 

 what different fallacy called the Fallacia plurium interrogationum, or 

 Fallacy of Many Questions (274, /.). 



From the analysis given above it will be seen that the sorites 

 is a series of enthymemes ; that the first of these is of the third 

 order, that the last is of the first (in the Goclenian) or second (in 

 the Aristotelean), and that the intermediate ones are represented 

 each by one proposition only a minor in the Goclenian, a major 

 1 C/. KEYNES, op. cit., p. 371, n. 



