GENERAL OUTLINE OF METHOD 3 



or methods of applying the mental processes we have been 

 mentioning, to the pursuit of truth, it will be useful here to take 

 a glance by anticipation at the main departments of human 

 knowledge which the logician may have in mind, and from 

 which he may draw his illustrations, in investigating such 

 methods. 



We have pointed out already, in common with all logicians, 

 that it is not the function of logic to explore the provinces of 

 the special sciences in order to expound the various modes of 

 procedure peculiar to each. This is the function of the special 

 sciences themselves : each has, or ought to have, its own special 

 methodology. Logic ought to confine itself to an exposition 

 of those guiding laws and principles of reasoning and research 

 which are so universal that the mind must conform to them 

 always and in every department of rational investigation. 1 In 

 thus limiting its field, logic will not be aiding the study of the 

 special sciences so directly as it will aid the study of philosophy 

 proper ; for philosophy presupposes a general knowledge of all 

 the special sciences and endeavours to synthesize their results ; 

 and in this arduous work it is guided by no other &quot; rules of philo 

 sophizing&quot; than the general canons and laws laid down in logic. 

 Indeed, if there be any science to which logic should serve as a 

 special introduction, it is philosophy, the &quot; general science,&quot; and 

 not any of the special sciences. 



But it is difficult to carry out in practice what is so simple in 

 theory. Just because philosophy does take up, interpret, collate, 

 and harmonize as far as possible the assumptions and conclu 

 sions of all the special sciences mathematical, physical, natural, 

 anthropological, social, economical, ethical, etc. it is not easy in 

 practice to say where the work of each special science ceases and 

 that of philosophy begins. And so it is, too, with regard to the 

 scope of logic. This may easily deviate into the investigation 

 of methodological details proper to special sciences ; or which is 

 a more serious mistake it may, by losing sight of some depart 

 ments of human experience and falling unduly under the influence 

 of others, set forth, as general canons of philosophical investiga 

 tion, methods that may be valid only within the narrower pre 

 suppositions of some special science or group of sciences. These 



1 &quot; Logica tradit communem modum procedendi in omnibus aliis scientiis. 

 Modus autem proprius singularum scientiarum, in scientiis singulis circa principium 

 tradi solet.&quot; ST. THOMAS, In II. Metaph. lect. 5. 



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