io THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 



must also, by a regressive movement of thought, apply its abstract principles 

 again to concrete facts, and by means of the former explain the latter. This 

 combined and alternating use of analysis and synthesis will be more fully 

 illustrated in connexion with the treatment of Induction, Demonstration, and 

 Scientific Explanation. It is commonly employed in the physical sciences, and 

 it is the only method by which a reliable philosophy of man and the universe 

 can be constructed. 1 



There have been, in different ages, philosophers such as Descartes 

 (1576-1650) and Spinoza (1632-1677), who have thought it possible to build up 

 a philosophy by the purely synthetic or deductive method, on the basis of a few 

 self-evident fundamental truths. Such projects are chimerical, for philosophy 

 is expected to offer an intelligible interpretation of universal human experience, 

 and must, therefore, set out from an analysis of this latter. 



The method of philosophy, too, like the methods of the sciences, is largely 

 influenced by the prevailing general views and standpoints of each successive 

 period : synthesis predominating in one school or in one epoch of philosophic 

 development, analysis in another : the former, for instance, in Plato and Neo- 

 Platonism, in St. Augustine and the early Middle Ages ; the latter in &quot; scien 

 tific &quot; and &quot; inductive &quot; philosophy since the Renaissance ; and neither, perhaps, 

 asserting undue supremacy in Aristotle, or in Scholasticism among its best 

 accredited representatives, whether mediaeval or modern. 



A system of philosophy aims at working out and establishing some definite 

 world-view, some interpretation of human experience as a whole. The method 

 or methods that may be involved in the elaboration of such a thought-system 

 will themselves usually imply assent to certain fundamental judgments, whether 

 these be put forward as axioms or as postulates (203, 231). And hence it is 

 that systems of philosophy are to be judged not only by their explicit positive 

 teaching or contents, but also by their methods, for these too imply doctrines. 2 

 Indeed, it has been said that metaphysical systems differ merely in the stand 

 points from which they approach the interpretation of experience. This is only 

 an exaggeration of the undoubted truth that every such system is largely in 

 fluenced and characterized by some predominating point of view. Thus, the 

 idea of a process of Development, a tendency towards the realization of an 

 ideal, as pervading not only thought but reality, has always exercised more or 

 less influence on the trend of philosophical speculation. But the scientific 

 discoveries of the last few centuries in regard to organic evolution among the 

 forms of life, have led many to suspect the existence and operation of an all- 

 pervading law of Evolution, and to adopt, in all departments, only methods of 

 research directly based on this postulate. The wisdom of this procedure is 

 questionable. If it is really unsound, results will in due time reveal its 

 deficiencies. 



203. GENERAL RULES OF METHOD. Various rules or 

 canons, of more or less practical utility, have been laid down for 

 observance in the pursuit of truth, under the title of General 

 Rules of Method. They are of the nature of counsels. A full 



1 Cf. MERCIF.R, Logique, p. 374 : Pratique de 1 analyse et de la synth&se en 

 philosophic. 



2 Cf. DE WULF, Scholasticism Old and New, pp. 190-200. 



