GENERAL OUTLINE OF METHOD 19 



He may, notwithstanding the explanations offered, urge some proposition 

 in the sense in which it has been denied. &quot; But . . . Therefore the difficulty 

 remains &quot;. &quot; Atqui . . . Ergo stat difficultas &quot;). To which the defender 

 replies, &quot; I deny what you subsume &quot; [&quot; Nego subsumtum &quot;]. The objector 

 must then proceed to prove the proposition in the sense in which it has been 

 denied. [&quot; Probo subsumptum&quot;~\ 



Or, again, the objector may urge the difficulty in a modified way, owing 

 to some concessions made by the defender in his explanation ; which he does 

 by commencing, &quot; But I insist . . .,&quot; or, &quot; But I urge the difficulty from your 

 own admissions &quot; (&quot; Atqui insto . . .,&quot; or, &quot; Atqui ex concessis urgeo 

 difficultatem &quot;. ) 



The real point of the difficulty ought to be kept in the minors as far as 

 possible : the distinctions made ought to be real, not merely verbal, i.e. ex 

 pressive of the same syllogism in different terms : quibbling and sophisms 

 ought to be rigorously excluded : the questions selected ought to be the more 

 serious ones, and the difficulties likewise : if the objector really feels the 

 difficulty he is putting, so much the better ; waste of time, vain display 

 of acuteness in making distinctions, or syllogisms more subtle than solid, 

 should not be tolerated : the number of syllogistic steps leading up to the 

 full solution of any difficulty will, of course, depend on the nature of the latter, 

 but need not usually exceed four or five, unless, indeed, a modified phase 

 of the difficulty, or a practically new difficulty, arises in the course of its solu 

 tion : exactness, lucidity, brevity in the formation of syllogisms and distinctions, 

 ought to be insisted on : and therefore, also, the necessary means to this end, 

 viz. familiarity with the technical tertninology of the philosophical problems 

 under discussion, and of philosophical terminology in general. 



Such are the principal canons laid down for observance in those exercises. 1 

 There is no reason why they should not be conducted in the vernacular if 

 necessary, rather than in Latin. The method is not wedded to any language ; 

 and philosophical thinking would be much less erratic and illogical than it is 

 at the present day if such disciplines formed an essential part of philosophical 

 training. 



The Scholastic system of philosophy is identified with constructive and 

 didactic methods which are nowadays eliciting a more accurate and sympa 

 thetic appreciation from scholars, after a long period of prejudice and mis 

 understanding. It took shape in the early mediaeval schools of Europe under 

 the combined influence of St. Augustine, Plato, and a few of the logical 

 writings of Aristotle. But the introduction of the latter s works into the 

 Western schools towards the close of the twelfth century gave Scholasticism 

 its predominantly Aristotelean character in the thirteenth. 2 To its preponder 

 ating use of synthesis as a constructive method we have already referred (201). 

 Its elaborate system of teaching, too, has had a profound influence on the 

 development of learning during many centuries. While recognizing its 

 limitations, we are bound in the interests of historical truth to give it credit for 

 many excellences. In general, we may say that the Scholastic method, 



1 C/. ZIGLIARA, Logica, (46), De methodo disputandi. 



2 C/. DE WULF, History of Medieval Philosophy, pp. 101-48; Scholasticism 

 Old and New, pp. 19-88, 168-82. 



