INDUCTION IN ITS VARIOUS SENSES 27 



207. THE SO-CALLED &quot; INDUCTIVE SYLLOGISM,&quot; OR &quot; INDUC 

 TION BY SIMPLE ENUMERATION OF INSTANCES&quot;&quot; COMPLETE&quot; 

 AND &quot; INCOMPLETE.&quot; Since induction is an ascent from par 

 ticular instances to general truths, from &quot; some &quot; to &quot;all,&quot; it has 

 been rightly described as a process of generalization. But we 

 have already repeatedly distinguished between the mere concrete, 

 collective, enumerative universal, and the really scientific universal 

 which is an abstract judgment, embodying some more or less 

 necessary principle or law (92, 195). It is this latter that scien 

 tific induction proper aims at establishing. Before dealing with 

 this, however, it will be convenient to examine the process by 

 which the collective judgment is reached. This process, too, has 

 been called &quot; induction &quot; : &quot; induction by complete enumeration&quot; 

 &quot; formal,&quot; &quot; perfect &quot; : to distinguish it from the other or &quot; scien 

 tific &quot; induction, which has sometimes been described as &quot; incom 

 plete,&quot; &quot; material,&quot; &quot; imperfect &quot;. The induction of the collective 

 judgment from a complete enumeration of its constituent instances 

 is &quot; formal &quot; and &quot; perfect &quot; merely by reason of the absolute cer 

 titude which we necessarily possess about the sum-total when we 

 have examined all the instances. But to call scientific induc 

 tion, which attains to the general law by an analysis of some 

 instances, &quot; incomplete &quot; and &quot; imperfect,&quot; is singularly unfor 

 tunate and misleading ; for it insinuates that this is a partial appli 

 cation of the former process, that it, too, attains to the universal 

 by enumeration, and that its result is &quot; imperfect &quot; or uncertain, 

 inasmuch as the enumeration is &quot; incomplete &quot;. As a matter of 

 fact, it does not reach the universal by enumeration at all. This 

 we shall see later on. 1 Let us here examine the process by which 

 the collective judgment is reached : the so-called &quot; inductive syllo 

 gism &quot;. &quot; Induction by complete enumeration &quot; may be defined 

 as the process by which we predicate about a whole class or collection 

 of things what we have already predicated of each thing separately. 



1 C/. JOSEPH, Logic, pp. 467-68; infra, 209, 211. 



2 Father Joyce (Principles of Logic, p. 228) confines this &quot; inductive syllogism &quot; 

 to the &quot; logical parts&quot; (species} of a &quot; logical whole&quot; (genus). It applies equally 

 well to the &quot; individuals &quot; of a &quot; lowest class,&quot; when these are limited in number and 

 can be exhaustively enumerated. Its principle, &quot; Whatever can be predicated of each 

 of the parts successively can be similarly predicated of the whole,&quot; is not to be re 

 garded as the reciprocal of the Aristotelean Dictum de omni et nullo : for this latter 

 must be interpreted to refer to an abstract, not to a concrete, universal : and, in pass 

 ing from the abstract &quot; M as such 1 to the &quot; All M s&quot; of the Dictum, we postu 

 late the principle to be discussed below (223-25) called the Uniformity of Nature, 



cf. 253-54- 



