32 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 



pov, TToieiv}, 1 the general principle. &quot; It is a mode of arranging a 

 deductive argument so as to enable us to realize psychologically, 

 the truth of the general principle (apx^i) which is the real major 

 premise a mode of illustrating the principle by bringing forward 

 instances. Of course we cannot get all the instances, except 

 where the number is limited ; but this fact does not vitiate an 

 illustrative induction such as Aristotle had in view (cf. Anal, 

 Post,!., 4, 73&amp;lt;*33)-&quot; 2 



If, therefore, Aristotle regarded the conclusion of any enumer- 

 ative induction as a strict, generic universal, he regarded the 

 knowledge of this as reached not by enumeration, but by analysis. 3 



As long as we have any doubt about the completeness of our 

 enumeration which is nearly always, and still rely on it alone 

 for our conclusion, we can only have provisional and probable, not 

 absolute and certain, knowledge, of the truth of the latter as a really 

 general proposition. But both the process and the conclusion 

 have in such cases this amount of utility, that they suggest to us, 

 more or less forcibly, the existence of some natural law, i.e. some 

 necessary natural connexion between the attribute predicated and 

 the class of things in question. When we find that a, b, c, d, e, are 

 P ; and know already that a, b, c, d, e, are 6&quot; (whether all S or 

 only some S, does not matter much), the surmise inevitably 

 suggests itself that there may be something (say M~) in the 

 nature of S (and therefore in all S s, whether examined or not) 

 which is the natural ground for P. In other words, the conclusion 

 Every S may, in virtue of the M that is in it, be P&quot; suggests it 

 self as an hypothesis worthy of investigation. Thus, our attention 

 is drawn away from the number of S s ; and the tendency asserts 

 itself not to aim at completing the enumeration which is usually 

 impossible, but to examine the nature of the phenomena in ques 

 tion, (the S s], and to seek in them for some natural attribute or pro 

 perty (M} that will be the ground or reason for our predicating P 

 of them. This marks the passage to scientific induction, whereby 

 we are able, without a complete enumeration of instances, to rise from 

 particular facts to the conception and discovery of some universal 

 natural law. 



208. SCIENTIFIC INDUCTION AS TREATED BY ARISTOTLE 

 AND THE MEDIAEVAL SCHOLASTICS. We have seen that the 

 general conclusion, when derived from an incomplete enumeration 



1 Cf. Anal. Prior, ii., 23 ; Top., i., 12 ; Anal. Post, i., 31. 



3 MELLONE, op. cit., p. 247. 3 Cf. JOSEPH, Logic, pp. 356-57. 



