INDUCTION IN ITS VARIOUS SENSES 33 



of instances, is never certain, and that such induction is called 

 &quot;imperfect&quot;. We find it sometimes stated by modern logicians 

 that the only way of ascending from the particular to the general, 

 explicitly treated by Aristotle, and the only way known to the 

 mediaeval Scholastic logicians, was that of enumerative induction, 

 &quot;complete &quot; and &quot; incomplete &quot; ; that we find in these authors no 

 trace of the method of modern scientific induction, the method of 

 attaining to the universal by analysing a limited number of in 

 stances and seeking therein a connexion of content, of attributes, 

 a causal connexion, in the nature of the phenomena considered. 

 Thus, Professor Welton writes : * &quot; The scholastic logicians . . . 

 made the essence of induction to consist in enumeration &quot; ; and 

 Dr. Mellone : 2 &quot; With the mediaeval logicians induction became 

 simply a process of counting particular things &quot;. And these authors 

 merely give expression to a traditional misconception, the origin 

 and growth of which are clearly and succinctly accounted for by 

 Father Joyce, in his Logic (p. 233): 



&quot; The error seems to have arisen from the fact that the most famous of 

 the Scholastics (St. Thomas, Albert the Great, Scotus) do not employ the term 

 induction as the distinctive name of the inference by which we establish uni 

 versal laws of nature. Following the terminology of Aristotle . . . they called 

 it proof from experience (e ^Treip/o, experimentum, experientia). The signi 

 ficance of the term induction was somewhat vague. It covered all argument 

 from the particular to the general \cf. 206]. Hence (as e.g. in Scotus, Anal. 

 Prior., ii., q. 8) it might include this meaning among others. But it was more 

 usually employed to denote the formal process of perfect induction [207] 

 arranged as an inductive syllogism. Moreover, it was sometimes pointed out, 

 that our argument might be thrown into the form of an inductive syllogism : 

 for, though the enumeration was incomplete, yet in these few instances we 

 have equivalently seen all \cf. infra, 209]. It was by a later generation that 

 the term induction was restricted to its present signification. Incautious 

 readers, finding in certain passages the inductive syllogism described as the 

 formula of inductive argument, jumped too hastily to the conclusion that the 

 mediaeval philosophers rested their knowledge of the laws of nature on no 

 basis but enumeration.&quot; 



Now, from the very fact that Aristotle and the Scholastics 

 considered it possible to reach a truth about &quot;#//,&quot; actual and 

 possible, known and unknown, by an acquaintance with &quot;some,&quot; 

 they must have recognized a method of ascent to the &quot; all&quot; other 

 than enumeration. And so they did : viz. the method nowadays 

 known as Physical or Scientific Induction. 



When, therefore, we hear it stated that Scientific Induction is 



1 op. dt., p. 33. a o/&amp;gt;. dt., p. 247. 



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