42 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 



to general laws : the formulation of an hypothesis suggested 

 somehow or other by an initial observation of phenomena ; the 

 moulding, remodelling, generalizing of this hypothesis, by suc 

 cessive eliminations and exclusions under the guidance of certain 

 canons of more or less practical utility, commonly known (after 

 J. S. Mill) as the &quot;experimental methods&quot; or &quot;inductive 

 methods&quot;; the final &quot;verification&quot; or &quot;establishment&quot; of the 

 hypothesis as a &quot; law &quot; ; the attempted &quot; explanation &quot; of this law 

 by wider laws ; the commencement of the synthetic or deductive 

 stage by the application of the established law to particular facts 

 for the &quot; explanation&quot; of these latter. 



Not all writers, however, attach the same importance to the 

 various stages. Whewell, 1 for instance, lays great stress on the 

 invention of hypotheses, or, in his own language, the &quot; colligation 

 of facts by means of an exact and appropriate conception,&quot; 2 as 

 the most important step in the discovery of scientific truths. To 

 the subsequent process of generalizing the abstract hypothesis, 

 of remoulding and remodelling and verifying it by the application 

 of fixed canons, he devotes much less attention. Its verification 

 or proof he holds to consist in deducing consequences from it, and 

 ascertaining whether it thus foretells phenomena, at least those of 

 the same kind as the phenomena for the explanation of which 

 it was invented. Should an hypothesis, invented to explain &quot; one 

 class of facts,&quot; be also found &quot; to explain another class of a 

 different nature,&quot; it is more firmly established than by any other 

 means : this Whewell calls Consilience of Inductions? 



J. S. Mill, on the other hand, almost entirely ignored the 

 theory of the initial step of conceiving an hypothesis. He ad 

 dressed himself to the process of generalizing directly from 

 particulars a process quite impossible apart from the abstract 

 conception of some guiding hypothesis, and to the establishment 

 of rules or canons for the correct carrying out of this process. 

 No doubt, this latter stage lends itself to methodical treatment, 

 while the former stage does not ; and Mill tried to justify his 

 mode of treatment by the plea that as a logician he was con 

 cerned only with the proof of general truths, not with their 

 discovery. There does not seem to be much force in such a plea. 



1 Flourished 1794-1866; among his writings are the History of the Inductive 

 Sciences (3 vols., 1837; 2nd edit. 1847; 3rd, 1857) and a Philosophy of the Inductive 

 Sciences (2 vols., 1840 ; 2nd edit. 1847 ; 3rd, in three vols., bearing separate titles, of 

 which one was called Novum Organon Renovatum, 1858-60). 



2 apud WBLTON, op. cit., ii., p. 50. ibid., p. 51. 



