48 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 



212. SCIENTIFIC INDUCTION AND DEDUCTIVE INFERENCE. 

 We have already compared Induction with Deduction, under 

 standing these terms as descriptive of Method (202 ; cf. 187). 

 They are sometimes contrasted with each other as forms of 

 logical inference. But, since induction is not a form of logical 

 inference at all, 1 such a comparison is misleading. The so- 

 called &quot; Induction by Complete Enumeration &quot; we have shown 

 to be as unworthy of the name of a reasoning process as is the 

 so-called &quot; syllogism &quot; understood in the sense attached to this 

 term by John Stuart Mill (207). Both processes deal with mere 

 collective propositions, and are simply additions of actual parts 

 to form an actual whole (&quot; induction &quot;), or redistribution of that 

 whole into its parts (&quot; syllogism &quot;). The one process is the 

 reverse of the other, but neither is a reasoning process : the one 

 is summation of individuals into a group ; the other, distribution 

 of the group into its members : neither reaches the abstract, 

 universal judgment. Complete enumerative induction, therefore, 

 cannot be compared with the genuine syllogism in any figure. 

 Incomplete enumerative induction, however, in so far as it shows 

 a connexion between two objects (M and P} to be possible, and 

 suggests that the connexion may be necessary and universal, is 

 naturally formulated, as we have seen, in the third figure of 

 syllogism (172, 207) ; but it is, in a certain sense, the opposite of 

 the scientific syllogism (in the first figure) : inasmuch, namely, as it 

 seeks to establish a general principle from instances, while the 

 latter applies an already established principle to instances. 



Does scientific induction, however, admit of any comparison 

 with deduction, or deductive inference, or the syllogism ? With 

 deduction as a method, yes. If we take both as methods, and 

 understand by induction the method whereby we ascend from the 

 consideration of particular facts to the establishment of some 

 general truth, in this meaning it is, of course, the reverse of the 

 whole deductive method, by which in the mathematical sciences, 

 for example we descend from the conception of some simple 

 and general truth to the understanding of some less simple and 

 less general one in the light of the former (202). The two 

 processes move in opposite directions: they view things from 

 opposite standpoints : they lead the mind along reality and into 

 the understanding of it by presenting opposite aspects of it : in 



1 Cf, supra, 197. JOYCE, Logic, p. 217. 



