INDUCTION IN ITS VARIOUS SENSES 55 



1 6 the product? Answer (indefinitely) : 2 x 8, or 4 x 4 (inverse 

 processes). 



Transferred to logic, this character of indefiniteness in the in 

 verse process is further emphasized. Given the conclusion of a 

 syllogism, find the premisses. An entirely indefinite problem, this, 

 since any one out of an immense number of middle terms may con 

 ceivably mediate the conclusion : and the inventio medii, the finding 

 of a real or true, as opposed to an imaginary, middle term (167), 

 like the invention and verification of an hypothesis, is amenable 

 to no law or method. The specifying of a middle term would 

 remove some of the indefiniteness, leaving only the possible moods 

 of the syllogism to be determined ; the assigning of one whole 

 premiss would leave the other premiss (definitely) to be deter 

 mined. 1 Something like this Professor Welton must have in mind * 

 when he agrees, with Jevons, that &quot; induction is ... an inverse 

 process ; it is the finding major premisses when the conclusions 

 are given &quot;. But why major premisses ? The inductive problem 

 seems rather that of finding the whole (proper and correct) 

 antecedent (major and minor], given the consequent or conclusion. 

 Given certain facts or effects, construct and verify an hypothesis as 

 to their cause. And from what we have already said about the 

 indefiniteness of the passage from a given effect or consequent to a 

 definite cause or antecedent, as compared with the direct process of 

 arguing from cause to effect, from antecedent to consequent, it 

 will easily be understood why the former process has been de 

 scribed as inverse, and the latter as direct. Yet, by describing 

 induction as an inverse process, the impression may be conveyed 

 that it reaches, de facto, only indefinite results. Such an impres 

 sion would be erroneous ; for the aim of induction is precisely to 

 eliminate this indefiniteness by proving some one of the conceiv 

 able alternative antecedents to be the real antecedent : which it 

 does, as we have seen, by the indirect method of disproving the 

 other alternatives. 



JOSEPH, Logic, chaps, xviii., xx., xxiii. MELLONE, op. cit., pp. 244 sgq., 

 265 sqq. JOYCE, Logic, chap. xiv. WELTON, op. cit., bk. v., chap. ii. VENN, 

 Empirical Logic, chap. xiv. MILL, Logic III., ii., iii. MERCIER, Logique, 

 pp. 298-307. 



1 C/. VENN, Empirical Logic, pp. 359 sqq, 

 a Logic, vol. ii., p. 59 (italics ours). 





