CONCEPTS OF REASON &quot; AND CA USE &quot; 59 



phenomenism, of the power of the human mind to reach real, 

 objective truth. 



The Principle of Sufficient Reason is, therefore, not merely 

 formal but raz/(i6). Not only can we not judge of a thing without 

 a sufficient reason in the thing itself for that judgment ; but also, 

 the thing itself, the reality itself, which is the object of our 

 thought, cannot be what it is, and as it is, unless it have a 

 sufficient reason in itself, or connected with itself, why it is, or 

 why it is so and not otherwise. 



But when we ask what shall we be obliged to regard as the ultimate 

 &quot;sufficient reason&quot; or &quot;explanation&quot; of our experience as a whole, the 

 answer will obviously depend upon the view which careful and prolonged re 

 flection on that experience will lead us to form about the nature and meaning 

 of all reality. And the conclusions we may reach on this fundamental 

 question will, of course, determine our interpretation of the exact scope and 

 significance of the principle under consideration. Two erroneous interpreta 

 tions of the principle, based on erroneous views about the nature of reality, 

 may be noticed here, in contrast with the scholastic interpretation which is 

 based on the philosophy of theism. 



One is variously known as Empiricism, Sensism, Positivism, Agnosti 

 cism. It is a mistake in method, no less than an error in fact, to assume, even 

 in regard to the inorganic universe, that no judgment about the latter can be 

 accepted as true without the same sort of cogent evidence which compels in 

 tellectual assent in the mathematical science of abstract mechanics ; that 

 a fact is &quot; intelligible &quot; or &quot; knowable &quot; only in so far forth as it illustrates the 

 laws of mechanical motion and inertia ; that the introduction of &quot; purpose,&quot; 

 &quot; design,&quot; &quot; intelligence,&quot; &quot; final causes,&quot; as factors to help in explaining the 

 processes of physical nature, is &quot; unscientific &quot; inasmuch as these factors 

 cannot be &quot; computed &quot; in terms of the laws and principles of mechanics, and 

 are, therefore, themselves not scientifically &quot; intelligible &quot;. Any such narrow 

 ing of the concept of what is &quot; knowable &quot; or &quot; intelligible &quot; is entirely 

 gratuitous and unwarranted. Yet the Positivist philosophy, which has been 

 popular in modern scientific circles, insinuates this misleading interpretation 

 of what is in itself a true and reasonable principle. For this philosophy would 

 have us believe that what is beyond the range of sense experience is &quot; un 

 knowable &quot; (Agnosticism) ; and that the phenomena of sense experience are 

 &quot; knowable &quot; or &quot; intelligible &quot; only in so far as their uniform coexistences 

 and sequences throughout space and time exemplify and constitute the &quot; laws &quot; 

 of mechanics (Mechanical Atomism). Reality may surely be &quot; knowable,&quot; 

 even though not amenable to any such laws ; and there may be some reality 

 within the reach of our intellect, even though it be beyond the reach of our 

 senses. 1 It was the misfortune of English philosophy, under the influence of 

 such men as Hume and Mill, to sink into this Sensism. By declaring all 

 reality to be, in ultimate analysis, a flow of sensations in the individual con 

 sciousness, they really declared all &quot; knowledge,&quot; all &quot; rational explanation &quot; of 



1 Cf. JOSEPH, Logic, pp. 382 sqq. 



