CONCEPTS OF &quot; REASON &quot; AND &quot; CA USE ^ i 



And, of efficient causes themselves, we may distinguish several 

 kinds : the First or Uncreated Cause, and second or created causes ; 

 the free cause which has the power of choice to act or not to 

 act, which can determine itself to act or not, which has &quot;do 

 minion &quot; or control of its act, and the non-free or necessary or 

 &quot; natural&quot; cause, which, when placed in a definite set of circum 

 stances, does always act, because it must act, because it has no 

 power or control over its own act, but is by its very nature so 

 constituted (by the First Cause) that (unless the First Cause 

 miraculously interferes) it will, by a necessity of its nature, always 

 act in those circumstances. 



Now, most modern writers on induction have come to use 

 the terms cause, and efficient cause, in the sense of a non-free or 

 necessary l cause. This in itself is not surprising, seeing that 

 they have mainly, if not exclusively, in view the physical universe, 

 inorganic and organic, exclusive of man ; and they may, perhaps, 

 regard the adjective &quot; physical,&quot; applied to &quot; cause,&quot; as a suf 

 ficient indication that they are dealing only with causes under 

 stood to be connected &quot;naturally&quot; or &quot;by a necessity of their 

 nature &quot; with their effects. 2 With this usage, then, we will not 

 quarrel, provided it be distinctly understood that there are, or 

 may be, in existence, free causes. Where ambiguity would be 

 likely to arise, we should use the adjectives &quot; free &quot; or &quot; necessary &quot;. 



An unfortunate result, however, of identifying efficient causality 

 with the uniform causality of necessary causes, calls for notice 

 here. It is the confusion of two quite distinct principles, the 

 &quot;principle of causality &quot; (216) and the &quot;principle of the uni 

 formity of nature&quot; (223), under the common title of the &quot;law 

 of universal causation &quot;. 3 But it is one assertion that &quot; The 

 same causes, acting in similar circumstances, will always produce 

 the same effect &quot; ; it is another and quite a different assertion 

 that &quot; Whatever happens has a cause &quot;. The former, which is 

 known as the &quot; principle of the uniformity of physical nature,&quot; 

 is not universally true, of all causes : as we shall see later (223), 

 it applies, strictly speaking, only to &quot;necessary&quot; or &quot;non-free&quot; 

 causes ; though it is often stated by modern writers in such a 

 way as to insinuate that it is of universal application : which, of 

 course, is tantamount to a denial of human free will. Similarly, 



1 The term &quot; necessitating&quot; would convey the idea better than &quot; necessary &quot;. 

 The latter term, however, can claim universal usage in this context. 



8 Cf. JOSEPH, op. cit., p. 373. 3 C y. MBLLONK, op. cit., p. 281. 



