io8 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 



Let us therefore apply to it the second test, which is this : &quot; if without 

 assuming [the principle] to be true, it is impossible to account for the facts of 

 our experience, we should have to suppose it unconditional ; though such im 

 possibility may be hard to establish &quot;^ The law of uniform causation is 

 supposed to fulfil this test, to be the only principle on which we can &quot; account 

 for the facts of our experience,&quot; and, therefore, to be unconditionally true. 

 And this supposed impossibility of otherwise accounting for &quot;the facts of our 

 experience &quot; is also alleged as the ultimate ground and justification of our 

 belief in the law : &quot; With what right then do we assume it ? The answer to 

 this has been given in discussing what we mean by it. To deny it is to 

 resolve the universe into items that have no intelligible connexion &quot;. 2 



This whole position calls for a few considerations. Firstly, to prove in 

 this indirect way that a principle must be true because, namely, it is the 

 only one that will &quot;account for the facts of our experience&quot; is a perfectly 

 legitimate procedure when the principle is not self-evident. It is a difficult 

 method, of course, to apply ; but, failing self-evidence, it is the only one ; nor 

 do we see why, having applied it carefully, &quot; we should not be fully satisfied 

 with it,&quot; 3 as Mr. Joseph thinks we should not. Is he himself, then, not 

 fully satisfied with the only way in which the law of uniform causation in its 

 categorical or applied sense can be shown to be true ? 



Secondly, if the law is established in this way, is it not based on facts, and 

 established by experience, as we have contended that it is ? * It is assumed 



although Mr. Joseph nowhere states that the law of (uniform) causation (in the cate 

 gorical or applied sense) is self-evident, he does assert that our belief in it &quot; rests . . . 

 on the perception that a thing must be itself. If it is the nature of one thing to produce 

 change in another, it will always produce that change in that other thing; just as, if 

 it is the nature of a triangle to be half the area of the rectangle on the same base 

 and between the same parallels, it will always be half that area&quot; (op. cit., p. 390 n.). 

 But, manifestly, the parity between those two examples holds good only on an 

 assumption which is, to put it mildly, not self-evident : the assumption that the same 

 necessity which characterizes the relations between static, abstract thought- objects, 

 or possible essences, in the conceptual order or a like necessity also characterizes 

 the relations between the concrete sense phenomena that actually exist in the ever 

 changing conditions of space and time (cf. 219). Apparently, Mr. Joseph has failed 

 to distinguish between the self-evidence of the abstract law of uniformity within the 

 conceptual order, and the entirely different grounds on which the application of this 

 law to the concrete, actual domain of sense experience must be maintained as valid. 

 J p. 382. a p. 390. 



3 p. 382. The feeling that this method is not quite satisfactory seems to us to 

 reveal that attitude of mind which would restrict the terms &quot; knowledge &quot; and 

 &quot;science&quot; to self-evident truths, and conclusions derived from these by cogent 

 demonstrative reasoning. 



4 We interpret Mr. Joseph s account of the principle, as given in his Logic, 

 pp. 380, 391, to propound the view that this principle is &quot; unconditional &quot; ; that we 

 know it to be &quot; unconditional,&quot; because, although it is not self-evident, the facts 

 force us to admit it, because the denial of it would &quot; resolve the universe into items 

 that have no intelligible connexion &quot;. But this implies that the law is based on 

 experience, and reached a posteriori. Yet, elsewhere he seems to hold that the 

 principle is self-evident : cf. p. 390, n. (n. n, p. 107) ; also p. 401, where he writes: 

 &quot; The law of the uniformity of nature itself, as we have seen, is not arrived at in 

 that way [i.e. a posteriori], since if we once doubt it, it is impossible to show that 



