UNI FORM IT Y OF NA TURE 1 09 



of course, not prior to, but in and with, all our experience ; l but when we 

 seek rational grounds for our assumption of it, where can these be found but 

 in the facts, in our experience ? When a law is established by this pro 

 cedure, we must, of course, recognize that &quot;had the facts been otherwise, we 

 need not have admitted the law ; and [that] we do not see, except on the 

 hypothesis that the law is true, why the facts might not have been other 

 wise &quot;. 2 This is the reason why Mr. Joseph regards such procedure as 

 unsatisfactory ; but if we believe in the law of uniform causation because it 

 is the only principle that will &quot;account for the facts of our experience,&quot; 

 surely we must be prepared to admit that &quot;had the facts been otherwise we 

 need not have admitted the law &quot; ; 3 and in this there can be nothing unsatis 

 factory. But if this is the way we justify our belief in the law, then, obviously, 

 that belief is not a prerequisite condition for experience, entirely prior to, and 

 independent of, experience, but is rather psychologically simultaneous with, 

 and philosophically grounded on, experience. 



Thirdly, it must be carefully noted that the abstract, hypothetical law 

 which alone is self-evident, being, in fact, reducible to the principle of 

 identity, as Mr. Joseph shows, and as we have already pointed out does not 

 and cannot, of itself , &quot;account for the facts of our experience&quot;. It belongs 

 to the conceptual or ideal order, the order of abstract objects of intellectual 

 thought ; whereas &quot; the facts of our experience &quot; belong to the phenomenal 

 order, i.e. is to the order of realities actually existing in space and time, and 

 subject to all the changeful conditions of such existence. But no purely 

 abstract, conceptual principle can, of itself, account for the actual existence or 

 permanence, in space and time, of the present &quot; choir of heaven and furniture 

 of earth&quot;. 4 It is the categorical principle alone &quot; Nature has been, is, and 

 will be, and must be, uniform &quot;that can give us any intelligible account of 

 the actual world of our experience, as distinct from a merely hypothetical 

 world constructed by our own thought from intellectual concepts. And 

 hence the supreme importance of determining in what sense nature must be 

 uniform, of &quot;discussing what we mean by&quot; 5 this &quot;must,&quot; and of assigning 

 a rational ground for our belief in this necessity, in the sense in which we 

 interpret it. 



Fourthly, as already explained, we believe this &quot;necessity,&quot; this &quot;must,&quot; 

 to be conditional, contingent, dependent on the Fiat of a Divine and All-wise 



the facts are any more consistent with its falsity than with its truth &quot;. The abstract 

 principle is, of course, self-evident, but the validity of its application to the actual 

 world of sense experience is not. 



1 It is quite true that &quot; if we once doubt&quot; the truth of the principle as applied 

 to the actual universe, &quot; it is impossible to show that the facts are any more con 

 sistent with its falsity than with its truth &quot; (op. cit., p. 401), or, in fact, to reason at all 

 about events in space and time beyond actual experience ; but from this it does not 

 follow that assent to the principle must be antecedent to, and independent of, all 

 experience. The principle, even in its applied sense, is not reached by any process 

 of logical inference. None the less, it is based on experience. From experience we 

 abstract the concepts embodied in the principle. Experience suggests the abstract 

 principle as validly applicable to the real world ; we assume that it is so applicable ; 

 and further experience justifies the assumption. 



2 JOSEPH, op. cit., p. 382. 3 ibid. 4 C/. MELLONE, op. cit., p. 282. 



5 JOSEPH, op. cit., p. 390. 



