UNIFORMITY OF NA TURE 1 1 1 



which are not themselves physical, and whose nature, therefore, it is beyond the 

 scope of physical science as such to explain : &quot; supposing that there are, if we 

 may so put it, spiritual conditions upon which the movements of bodies in the 

 last resort depend . . . then physical science at any rate cannot deal with those 

 conditions &quot;- 1 Of course it cannot, since it does not purport to deal with all 

 reality : but we expect from the physical scientist that he should not go on to 

 deny the existence of such conditions merely because they fall beyond his 

 scope and methods as a scientist : 2 he is doing a real service to his science by 

 recognizing its limitations. But physical science and philosophy are both 

 brought into disrepute by those who gratuitously deny the existence of ultra- 

 physical conditions and causes, who contend that mechanical laws are uncon 

 ditional, and that all existing reality can be explained by these laws, when, as 

 a matter of fact, such laws offer no ultimate explanation even of the material 

 universe. Mr. Joseph fails to note, however, that there is this still more funda 

 mental reason for rejecting the mechanical view : that it purports to explain 

 the actual, concrete existence and uniform course of nature, by the mere formu 

 lation of some one or some few mechanical laws. How could any abstract, 

 intellectual formula about atoms, mass, motion, energy, etc. even were such 

 a formula self-evident account for the actual existence and course of nature ? 

 An abstract law cannot account for existing facts, or for the uniformity or 

 necessity 3 of actual processes. Actual facts demand an actual cause, and so 

 does the mode whether uniform, or necessary, or otherwise in which they 

 happen. If, then, all physical nature is dependent on, and refers us to, an 

 ultra-physical or spiritual domain of reality, and if even the highest and 

 widest physical laws are not absolutely ultimate, but conditioned by the reality 

 or realities of this other domain, it is obviously the highest duty of the philo 

 sopher to determine the nature and influence of these conditions. But is it 

 not also the duty of the logician to take note of, and call attention to, all the 

 leading alternative ways in which these conditions have been, or may be, con 

 ceived by philosophers ? or at least not to convey the impression that these 

 alternatives are fewer than they really are ? Now, according to Mr. Joseph, 

 if we are dissatisfied with the &quot; mechanical &quot; alternative, &quot; philosophy suggests 



1 JOSEPH, op. cit., p. 385. 



z cf. MAHER, Psychology, p. 420: &quot;The student should always remember that 

 physical science simply assumes the law of uniform causation ; that its universality 

 is merely a postulate to be justified only in metaphysics ; and that the metaphysician, 

 who recognizes moral convictions to be not less real nor less weighty facts than 

 those of physical science, is bound to qualify, limit, or interpret the law when applied 

 to moral actions in accordance with his wider and more comprehensive view of ex 

 perience&quot;. C/. also pp. 517-24, especially p. 519, n. 32. 



3 It is no ultimate explanation of this necessity to say that it is &quot; mechanical &quot;. 

 If all nature is merely one vast machine or mechanism, who made it ? The neces 

 sity we ascribe to the course of actual nature in time and space is not the necessity 

 we ascribe to abstract judgments about possible essences : it is not purely intellectual : 

 it is a manifestation of intelligence and will and power. The only immediate source 

 it can have is our experience of the order, regularity, uniformity of all nature, compel 

 ling us to interpret the latter as a cosmos, as the work of an Omnipotent Will directed 

 by Supreme Wisdom. The only necessity for which we can rationally account in 

 actual nature is that by which it pursues the course marked out for it by the Divine 

 Fiat. To say as a last word about the course of nature that it is &quot;mechanical,&quot; is 

 no better than to ascribe it to mere chance, or to pronounce it an insoluble enigma. 



