1 1 2 THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 



that in the last resort, instead of explaining consciousness in terms of physical 

 law, we shall have to see in physical law a manifestation of intelligence. The 

 whole material order is an object of apprehension ; therein, however it stands 

 related to minds that apprehend it, it and they together form the complete 

 reality, or res completa ; and they cannot be understood except together &quot;. 



As a final word on the problem, this is hardly satisfactory. At least, the 

 statement might be a little more explicit. In justification, presumably, of his 

 brevity, the author adds : &quot; It is not our business to discuss here this central 

 metaphysical problem &quot;. That is so ; but from what he does say, and leave 

 unsaid, about it, we are left in doubt whether or not he is really committing 

 himself to the philosophy of idealistic or spiritualistic monism. &quot; The whole 

 material order,&quot; and &quot; minds,&quot; &quot; together form the complete reality, or res com 

 pleta&quot; That sounds like monism. A few pages further on he writes : &quot; If the 

 whole series of events in time can be regarded as an expression of the activity 

 of that which is in some way exempt from subjection to succession, then what 

 appears in time as future may have to be taken into account in giving a reason 

 for the present and the past, though of course the future cannot determine the 

 present in the same way as what precedes it does &quot;. 2 But this statement 

 which apparently refers to the influence of final cause, or purpose, in the course 

 of events is equally compatible with theism or with spiritualistic monism. 

 And we get no clue as to which alternative the author himself adopts ; he 

 merely adds : &quot; The present chapter is perhaps already more than sufficiently 

 metaphysical &quot;. 



But there is a graver inconvenience in his treatment of the question : what 

 he has managed to say, and to leave unsaid, may seriously mislead the student. 

 When he chose to set over against the mechanical, materialist view of nature, the 

 Ideological, spiritualist view, he made mention of only one form of spiritualism, 

 the pantheistic or monistic form. Why has he passed over in silence the other 

 well-known alternative, the philosophy of theism ? Theism is at least a pos 

 sible alternative to monism. Therefore it claims a mention from the logician. 

 But, according to Mr. Joseph, if we reject mechanical materialism, &quot; philosophy 

 suggests that in the last resort, instead of explaining consciousness in terms 

 of physical law, we shall have to see in a physical law a manifestation of in 

 telligence &quot;. 3 Philosophy does not suggest this as a &quot; last resort &quot;. And, even 

 if it did, the suggestion would be ambiguous : Of what intelligence are we to re 

 gard physical law as a manifestation ? our own individual intelligences ? or an 

 immanent cosmic intelligence an anima mundi f an intelligence &quot;with will, 

 or one without will ? an unconscious, or a self-conscious, intelligence ? And 

 what sort of manifestation ? a manifestation of one reality, itself to itself, by 

 an inner process of self-evolution, so that the one reality is substance and pro 

 cess and law and cause and effect all at once ? These are all various forms 

 or phases of monism, which &quot; philosophy,&quot; i.e. mature reflection on the facts 

 of experience, may suggest. But, besides all of them, philosophy has at all 

 times persistently suggested an alternative omitted by Mr. Joseph, the alter 

 native which we believe to be the true one, viz., that physical law is a 

 manifestation, to men s minds, of the intelligence and will of a Necessaiy, 

 Self-existent, Divine, All-perfect Being, really distinct from the finite, con 

 tingent, dependent, and conditioned universe of sense experience, the &quot; world 



1 JOSEPH, op. cit., p. 384. 2 p. 390, n. D p. 384 (italics ours). 



